any group of people, regardless of whether thist they qualify under court's traditional test for suspectedness. and -- and the hypothetical i understood you to be offering, i would submit would create -- it would -- unless there's something that -- that is not occurring to me immediately, an arbitrary and capricious distinction among similarly situated individuals, that -- that is not what we think is at the -- at the root of the traditional definition of marriage. >> mr. cooper, could i just understand your argument. in reading the briefs, it seems as though your principal argument is that same-sex and opposite -- opposite-sex couples are not similarly situated because opposite-sex couples can procreate, same-sex couples cannot, and the state's principal interest in marriage is in regulating procreation. is that basically correct? >> i -- your honor, that's the essential thrust of our -- our position, yes. >> is -- is there -- so you have sort of a reason for not including same-sex couples. is there any reason that you have for excluding them? saying, words, you're well, if we allow same-sex