i thought fred kemp did a fantastic job of sort of summarizing the essence of our june 5th conference which started this effort, sort of where the world is headed in the medium and long-term. these major changes that are underway and our job is how do we posture nato to be as ready as possible for the surprises that will come for the contingencies that may be likely and for sort of deterrence approaches that are reasonable and effective in light of the budget constraints that we all face. so i think the types of issues he addressed, in particular i think one that i would add is this rise of individual power. individual empowerment governed by the rise of a global middle class, largely focused in asia but also by disruptive technologies that are giving individuals and groups for the first time in history the ability to take strategically significant action in a major way. with biotech, with 3d printing, with other technologies, i think it's clear we're going to have to spend more time in the future as planners looking at the individual level of challenges and opportunities, as well as

at what are cyber problems, not just as -- this is fred telling me to stop pitching my book, and fred kempe is the last person to tell you to not pitch a book. >> i think this may have been our own cyber attack here at the atlantic council. >> and when we look at what's happened to cyber, not just as crime, not just as a collection of individual cyber attacks, but as actual conflict, and how else should nato look at cyber other than actual conflict? we find that all of these technical things, speed of light, you never know who's responsible, it's so difficult to warn about, two people in the computer constitute as strategic capability. none of that, it's true at the technical level, but it's not true at the level of conflict. because what you found when you look at it as conflict is that it overwhelmingly takes place within existing conflict or an ongoing conflict between existing national rivals, which means that all of these technical truths fall away, because you're generally going to know who's responsible, because it's going to be the country that you're involved with an existing confl

asia looms very large, as fred kempe said, this is where economic power is shifting and defense budgets across asia are rising very rapidly, and we can talk about some of the statistics, but there's also challenges associated with non-state actors, as i said, individuals and groups. and i worry in particular about bioterrorism these days with a very significant expansion of the proliferation of centers of biological expertise, unfortunately, i think it's much more likely we'll see bioterrorism, and i think nato publics could be better informed and more resilient to these types of threats. so there are elements of the deterrence and assurance approaches even in dealing with nonstate actors, which we could talk about more. and even in asia, i think, there are nato members that have territory on the pacific ocean, for instance, if the north korean icbm hits guam, that's an article 5 pacific contingency. we should talk about sort of what that means for nato and nato planning and nato responses, but i don't think there's any getting around that essential fact. now, in terms of the tools that