, what they know is miss saigon, controversy. the controversy was around the casting of jonathan pryce to play the lead... >> yeah, we were feeling the controversy in london too, because he and i were both still in the show as it was running in the uk. we were both still in the original company. i think when the casting announcement was made, there was a big uproar in new york city. and cameron then said that he was going to cancel the show if he wasn't cast. >> hinojosa: just so people remember, so the uproar was about the fact that they were casting... >> a caucasian actor to play a eurasian part. >> hinojosa: and then in terms of your controversy... >> in terms of my controversy it was kind of the opposite, because it was an asian part, and i was an asian actor, but i wasn't an american citizen. >> hinojosa: and they tried to... >> so i was... yeah. so there was actually arbitration that went... >> hinojosa: it's amazing. people kind of forget, but you were actually... you were... the fact that you weren't an american citizen

now, of course, instability in saigon is also an important part of this equation.so are the dez certifications and corruptions of the forces of the south vietnamese army and oftentimes, clearly get this from americans in particular, they see a south vietnamese army that is often unsympathetic to the country's rural population. and by 1966 and '67 in particular, you see frustration budge up from american officer corps as well as the civilian leaders were directing the war effort. moreover, i think american military effectiveness, and here's the important point in this larger point i would like to make about the problem of implementation, is that any military effectiveness could not impose political con stan soil the saigon's leadership. nor could if it force the south vietnamese armed forces or the population to view the central government in saigon as the single legitimate political entity, which could better combat the insur gent threat and perhaps more importantly take into account the population's needs. in short, not all problems inside south vietnam could be s

to expand the percentage of the local population under the saigon government's control. now in june 1965 cable from westmoreland outlines his concept of operations and it notes clearly that the insurgency in south vietnam must eventually be defeated among the people in the hamlets and towns, westmoreland realizes that this is a war that's going to be fought among the population. and as he directs his commander later that year, the war in vietnam is a political as well as a military war. it is political because the ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people and to create conditions which permit the people to go about their normal lives in peace and security. he might question the capacity of his forces to regain the loyalty of the the local population. now, certainly westmoreland used the word attrition. he used it in his memoirs, he used it in his correspondent with senior and sub order nachblt kmachkders. every time he used it, it was in the condition text of talking about a long war. simple words like attrition could not fully characterize thi

into saigon brought area around saigon oh which was destroyed after the first tet offensive. dear mom, mike, and jim. only time for a short line. you know ted to let we're both fine. we've been fighting in saigon for the last three days. entire battalion, many casualties. no doubt you'll be hearing about the second and the 42nd infantry in saigon. there seemed to be a lot of television cameras around. i was a shameless politician looking for a camera. called back were to bearcat, that was our to start nco camp academy training tomorrow. i'm a little surprised they tom and i both together. well, tom and i will be in eting against each other academy. e know that the haguele brothers have the first and second spots nailed down. which st a matter of hagel gets first? actually neither hagel got first. in the money and we did get through. but we didn't -- we didn't score in the -- i think tom remembers -- i thinktly than i i was third, he feels fourth. but he doesn't think so. so things are looking much better. fieldl go back out to the back into saigon if we're still there in the

into the area around saigon, which was a chinese district. it was pretty much destroyed after the first offensive. dear mom, mike and jim. only time for a short line, but we wanted to let you know that we're both fine. we've been fighting in saigon for the last three days. our entire battalion, many casualties. no doubt you'll be hearing about the second of the 47th infantry in saigon. there seem to be a lot of television cameras around. even then i was a shameless politician looking for a camera, but tom and i were called back to bear cat. that was our division base camp. to start nco academy training tomorrow. i'm a little surprised they would take tom and i both together. well, tom and i will be competing against each other in the nco academy. we already know that the hagel brothers have the first and second spots nailed down. it's just a matter of which hagel gets first. actually, neither hagel got first. we did get through, but we did not score in the -- i think tom remembers it differently than i. i think i was third, he was fourth. but

of which an economist party who all agreed and let a very popular war against the government and saigon and their allies, the united states. what does show is him out there was a lot of intraparty struggles, a lot of the rivalries, a lot of just ugly fights that took place in the top echelon of power in north vietnam in hanoi. to rather than this harmonious body of leadership to comrades who led and all agree comprises actually a very divisive communist party, not quite as bloody as their counterparts in the soviet union and people's republic of china but there were a lot of intraparty struggles that we need to understand in order to really get a grasp of how hanoi leaders were able to lead the countrymen to war. and what a show under the general secretary as well as his right hand deputy, a man awarded the nobel prize along with henry kissinger so long ago, but they let what i call the police state by promoting the party. what they did was their number one target actually was ho chi minh and the cello, bitumen most closely associate with the flood leadership which were silenced a sleep

saigon under fire. >> the enemy in vietnam has demolished the myth that a live military strength controlstry. >> the american embassy is under siege. inside are the vietcong terror squads that charged in during the night. >> the tet offensive was an enormous game changer. they were shooting up the american embassy. they had hit dozens of cities all over vietnam. it was a tremendous shock. >> we have known for several months now that the communist planned a massive, winter-spring offensive. we do not think that our military operations are going to be at all materially affected. >> he was unable to be honest with the american people, because, of course, he was unwilling to simply say, this is an unwinnable war. >> cronkite's vietnam report, reel one, take four. >> these ruins are in saigon, capital of the largest city of south vietnam. >> when he went to vietnam during tet, it was the first time, and maybe the only time, that walter had shown any kind of bias in his public broadcast. >> it is increasingly clear to this report, that the only rational way out would be to negotiate, not as vic

then a tablespoon and then maybe a big bucket and then ultimately helicopters on the roof of the saigonbassy. the cardinal advantage of being a super power is super power. when we must intervene militarily, we should whack those suckers with a 2 x 4 between the eyes. everything you got. that's how you save american lives. that's how you accomplish the+f >>> do you ever feel maybe it was the wrong decision? >> no. my regret is that a violent group of people (co#ñ2meec ris again. this is now kind of plus. and i put in the book they need to be defeated and i hope we do. it's -- i hope the strategy works >> the president, 4,000 americans gave their lives, many more lost limbs many suffered severe injuries. the president watched every city that american troops fought fall and did nothing. not a thing. didn't lift a finger. >> yes. hypocrisy on the left has been horrific had bill clinton deposed saddam hussien he would have been celebrated on the left as the greatest liberator since abraham lincoln i'm disturbed about this letter our president sent. he betrayed our allies and and strain. bu

then a tablespoon and then maybe a big bucket and then ultimately helicopters on the roof of the saigonembassy. it's a no-brainer. the cardinal advantage of being a super power is super power. when we must intervene militarily, we should whack those suckers with a 2 x 4 between the eyes. everything you got. that's how you save american lives. that's how you accomplish the mission. >> now, president bush was asked if he regrets the invasion of iraq. i think that's the wrong question. and i'll see him tomorrow. and we're going to air my interview with him on thursday night. i think the question is does he regret that we didn't sustain the victory that he achieved. but here is how it went down with bob schieffer. >> do you ever feel that maybe it was the wrong decision? >> no, i think it was the right decision. my regret is that a violent group of people have risen up again. this is an al qaeda plus. and i put in the book they need to be defeated. and i hope we do. i hope the strategy works. >> the president, 4,000 americans gave their lives. many more lost limbs. many more suffered severe

come to our part of the world in the asia-pacific region, in the period since the fall of saigon in 1975, really through until very recently, if you were to look at a 35-year sweep, the globalization project in, let's call it the asian hemisphere, has proceed remarkably successfully. we've had no major conflicts within the hemisphere. we have produced phenomenal economic growth. we have produced extraordinary increases in living standards. unparalleled in human history and the numbers of people that have been drawn out of poverty. as a consequence, a dynamism to the intraregional discourse within wider asia that we hadn't seen before either. those westerners looking on to the phenomenon called "asia," which is a european construct in itself when you think of the term, "asia," meaning the east. east of where? presumably london, paris or berlin or rome. but if you look at what is unfolded in asia itself, it's the internal dynamics which have generated so much of the wealth, the prosperity and the success. and the external dynamics with the extra regional partners has also been important, p

much of my discussion tonight obviously focused on the ground war inside saigon, but there's also an air war over south vietnam which is only of tangential, not concern, but only tangentially under the responsibility of westmoreland. he has no control over the bombing campaign in the north. he's occasionally asked his opinion. he has no control over the navy and he has relatively little control over the south vietnamese forces. again, this is more an advisory role for the americans than it is a full-blown we are in command over the south vietnamese forces, and the reason that the decision is made not to put -- officially put south vietnamese forces under american control is to work against north vietnamese propaganda which throughout the war was calling the south vietnamese army the puppet army, and the last thing that westmoreland and senior military american commanders wanted to do was officially put south vietnamese armed forces underneath american operational control to lend credence to that propaganda. but that's be a important here, that there are many wars over south vietnam a