weekend certainty that for bioterror. i think we are not we are one of many companies proposing that the we got to rethink the way that we approve these vaccines. with all due respect to the animal rule, in many instances of the vaccines that we are producing cannot be tested in animals because human responses are different. there are new models available that should be evaluated as means of testing vaccines before moving them into -- >> is the fda process the only path to your proposal? >> i could have a significant impediment is the way that this kind of work is funded. so, for example we work through the sbi system which has been cut dramatically in the last few years for many reasons as people are well aware of. and we had grants that had extremely good scores that were not funded even though we full pathogens that are considered bioterror threats. those we could not get funded because of those situations in place but that should be a priority. barda, which does a great job, cannot reach across the invisible line that

not particularly for bioterrorism. but we are organized for hurricanes. we have seven days of them, and all sorts of structures because we are in a coastal region and we know exactly what we are going to do with 10,000 students if we have to evacuate them. but with bioterrorism and the kind of thing that we are talking about, it requires a different structure because you have to have a public health infrastructure, but more than a public health infrastructure, the private sector must be welded together with the public sector. so, what we need to do is think about how you glued the system together and then let it through a series of exercises, so it actually works. so that everybody knows what they are doing. the fact that nurses we heard have not read the disaster plan is a disaster in itself. the challenge it seems, for high officials, is to figure out how to put federalism together in a way in which it works to be able to manage our way through what are much more complicated crises in my judgment than the kind of bombing or terrorism assaults on buildin

agricultural bioterrorism and command that i left in 2,005, bob came on. then at the end of the administration they abolish the office again. the obama administration came in about what we don't do this. i was astounded. this was -- i did not know what to say. they then balkanized health issues divided them up against three different directorates and to this day i still cannot figure out on bio security and by a response recovery planning preparedness countermeasures, development who at the white house is really in charge of what issue. i can figure it out but it takes a little while. and this is interesting because in the latest national security strategy that was just published last month by president obama health is one of the top strategic risks to our interest. there are only eight and health was one of them. it is still a pretty mushy system. the ebola outbreak continued to puzzle me as to why they have divided up the response and coordination of the agencies among so many different parts of the white house. i was out in california. i will finish bec

not particularly for bioterrorism, but we certainly are well organized for hurricanes. we have seven days of food and structure about because we are in a coastal region, we know exactly what we will be doing the 10,000 units if we have to evacuate them. i can tell you about the planes, ships, i mean, we plan down to a level of detail. bioterrorism and the kind of thing we are talking about with wires, it seems to be, a different structure because you have to have a public health infrastructure. more than a public health infrastructure, the private sector has to be wielded together with the public sector. what we need to do is to think about how you glued the system together and put it through a series of exercises so it actually works and everybody knows what they are doing. the facts that the nurses we heard have not read the disaster plans is a disaster in itself. so, the challenge it seems to be for high officials is to figure out how to put federalism together in a way in which it works. to be able to manage our way through what are much more complicated crises in m

that we had seen come across our desks, we said, why don't we get the executive branch guru on bioterrorism? that is the same look we got back right there. they all went, uh, uh we know people who are experts on it and there really were. but there was no coordinating effort. this is where i found interesting in the ills that we produced. we still had one flaw we were never able to get over. now you are asking people who are engaged every day in very serious matters of public health to deal with something that has to do with terrorism. it's a little out of their lane. obviously, the understand the medical consequences, but it was a little out of their lane to figure out -- i'm worried about keeping my hospital emergency room's open. it was bad, but not necessarily in their lane. there is some value in trying to find someplace to coordinate all of the information of threat and integrate it with the public health side of it. there will always be a difference of opinion -- not necessarily a difference of opinion, but a different at two to about it. if you are in the intelligence business and yo

this insidious form of bioterrorism doesn't mimic the effects of an endemic disease. or successfully weaponize and disburse polio. rather denying prevention measures, the disease is permitted to run its course. violent and obstructionist acts that have been taking place, we've seen in 2014 there were nearly 90 related killings of health care workers that went out to vaccinate children. >> 80 of those were in pakistan, with about 10 in nigeria. in short, the effects of preventing access due to violent extremism and thus denying children a potentially life saving intervention are no different than actively exposing children to polio as a weapon. on that, a point that i would like to make as a recommendation, until there's recognition by the security apparatus in pakistan, whether it's law enforcement or military, polio's threat to its national security whereby security forces are actively engaged in threat reduction efforts, polio will continue its resurgence, that also raises a national security concern for the united states and the rest of the world. >> from there i w

perhaps it can be labeled as passive bioterrorism. terrorists are deliberately disrupting disease prevention systems in place i.e. vaccines incentivizing obstructionist behavior including committing violence against health care workers as well as sacrificing children to did these. and they are murder should they succumbed to illness or death. the insidious form of bioterrorism does not require the need for manipulating pathogens or even mimic the effects of an endemic to these were successfully westernized the first polio rather deliberately denying prevention measures for diseases permitted to run its course unfettered. additionally, finds an obstructionist acts taking place we seen a 2014 nearly 90 related killings of health care workers that when not to vaccinate children. 80 of those health care workers targeted and killed were in pakistan or 10 in nigeria. in short the effects of preventing access to health care or is to immunize children due to violent extremism into nine children with a life even in her bench and are actively e

often centered around our threat matrix of bioterror attacks and our ability to respond in a way that i think would be completely appropriate. so anna eshoo and i started in 2006 after a series of investigative is too strong but at least inquiries into the status of terrorist at least attempting in their interest in obtaining bioweapons. what we found was there was a high degree of interest in obtaining weapons but were in the middle of the conflict in iraq. we were busy in the middle of the conflict in afghanistan at that point. and the focus was not just necessarily where it needed to be. so looking back at the white house at the time the bush administration collectively with an issue, mike rogers republicans working with the white house, we agreed that we need to have a special fund our effort to try to produce countermeasures in a mark where there was no marketplace for. that was the biggest problem. there's only one single customer in reality for these countermeasures. so i don't care if it's radiological exposure. i don't care if it's smallpox on a large scale, bubonic plague wh

hspd 9, agriculture bioterrorism. then i left in 2005, bob came on and took over the job. then at the end of the administration, they abolished the office again. the obama administration came in and thought, we don't do this. i was astounded. this was -- i didn't know what to say. they volcanized the issues and divided them up between directors. to this day i cannot figure out on biosecurity and bioresponse recovery plan preparedness counter-measures, development, who at the white house is really in charge of what issue. i can figure it out but it takes a while. this is interesting because in the latest national security strategy which is published last month by president obama health is quoted as one of the top strategic risks to your interest. there's only eight. health is one of them. health and pandemics. it's still a pretty mushy system. the ebola outbreak continued to puzzle me as to why they had divided up the response and coordination of the agencies among so many different parts of the white house. i was out in california, i'm going to just finish because i want t

be make way of sensitizing people to thinking about how you would deal with certain issues in bioterrorism. it's just something to think about. >> any further comments? >> no. >> we thank you very much for your contribution. we very much appreciate your testimony. got prepared in march, hope leaving with the team, like to go over them. after you've left, we'll go over them. >> thank you very much. >> you bet. >>> tonight on c-span a week long series on congressional freshman starting with republican steve russell of oklahoma. he talks about his career in the army, new life in congress and childhood experience. a different profile each night at 9:00 eastern. with congress on break, it's american history tv in prime time starting at 8:00 eastern with daniel ellsberg who become consultant to the defense department on matters concerning vietnam war. he talks about his motivation leaking pentagon papers and his opinions on vietnam. that wouldish followed by interview, followed by counsel to the president. he talks about his early assignments, watergate and people behind the 1972 break-in at hea

what have you learned since then and what kind of trade, if that had a bioterrorism aspect would comeinto didn't know at the time what it was, what's the difference between the training of your people now and what happened 20 years ago? >> i think anytime you have an event like that, and again not only the bombing of 20 years ago but as i pointed out, we have very regular natural disasters. you learn lessons and learn what works well and what don't. i was in terms of the bombing before the was in nam smart national management system that was in every case a nims event. because of the agencies involved in the federal building obviously. as the doctor mentioned that was our first experience using the urban search and rescue teams that are sponsored by thematic throughout the country. we just 13 that were deployed during that event. -- enough. we recognize in a coma city that we weren't as skilled and has equipped an urban search and rescue as far as building collapse, those types of tactical risks, comes to that event that we need to be. that is certainly, since then and since we've dev

and the foreign affairs analyst who was also one of the original whistleblowers on iran's nuclear bioterror weapons capability back in 2002. can iran be trusted in this agreement? guest: i think there is a fair possibility iran can be trusted. i do not think the united states government, let alone its partners would have gone this far if they did not think iran could be trusted. i think the behavior of washington and its allies speaks volumes. alix: it appears on the surface -- what is your take -- is this better for iran or the west? kamran: we do not have a lot to go on. most of the details we got quite a bit of detail, but there is operable as age and, there is discussion on those details that needs to calm. i think we have to be careful. and most importantly, how each side he is going to sell it to its public. we have already seen the president and secretary kerry do that pretty united date -- do that for the united states domestic audience. the problem here is each side has its own perspective on this. that perspective resonates in a very complicated way in each other's capitals. what

. >>> also bioterrorism is something we'll hear more of in the future. these things spread.ty of the food supply. that is fundamental to our confidence. >> just as we would for water or power. dan, any concerns about the food we're eating day in day out. >> i think there should be a standardized policy for handling recalls. i'm thinking specifically about the blue bell ice cream recall because originally it was limited to some chocolate chip cookie dough ice cream and now the company expanded it to all of its products because of the listeria concerns. you think, why would you err on the side of being conservative. >> we know why. it's costly. there should be a required disclosure as soon as something like this is the case shouldn't there, dan? >> listen i think big poultry, the food industry in the country is obviously incredibly important and powerful. i'm not surprised that -- >> wait i'm asking our resident vegan here. >> i'll take the admittedly obnoxiously sounding did. >> that means fish. >> i won't eat farm fish. what goes on is more or less disgusting. that's a perso

centers because we're really -- we're dealing with this every day, without knowing whether it is a bioterrorismbreak but with a system that looks at patterns. >> thank you, to elaborate on that, i think you're setting it up absolutely correctly. what we're not suggesting in this discussion is that anything different would be created. simply what we're saying is sort of what happened during the ebola response in this country is that we had facilities with expertise, material, equipment, and frankly the where with all to take care of the disease as it went through the arch of the disease. with the expectation that any hospital should be able to recognize it, report it, do -9 stabilization procedures, control it, and if it was something that had specialization requirements, that might be referred on to a center of sclengsexcellence or a center of specialization or however you want to describe it. i don't want to use a trauma analogy, but i'm going to you. the truth is, most hospitals in the united states, you can't control who comes through the door. we have laws that prevent that and rightly so.

often centered around our threat matrix of bioterror attacks and our ability to respond in a way that i think would be completely appropriate. so we started in 2006 after a series of investigative is too strong, but at least inquiries into the status of terrorists at least attempting in their interest and obtaining bioweapons. and what we found was there was a high degree of interest in obtaining weapons but were in the middle of a conflict in iraq. we were obviously in the middle of a conflict in afghanistan at this point. and the focus was not necessarily where it needed to be. working back with the white house at the time the bush administration collectively with democrat mike rogers, republican, working with the white house, we agreed that we needed to have a special fund or effort to try to produce counter measures in a market where there was no marketplace for it. and that was the biggest problem. there is only one single customer in reality for these counter measures. so i don't care if it's radiological exposure or i don't care if it's smallpox on a large scale, bubonic plague