does metadata fill in the gap? for the entire panel. let's start with ms. hess, please. >> yes, sir. we are increasingly seeing the issue currently in just the first six months of this fiscal year, starting from last october. we're seeing of, in the fbi, the number of cell phones that we have seized as evidence, we're encountering passwords about 30% of the time, and we have no capability around 13% of that time. we are seeing those numbers continue to increase. and clearly, that presents us with a challenge. >> thank you. >> sir, just i'll give you some numbers. we have approximately 102 devices that we couldn't get in, and these are 67 of them being apple devices. and if i just look at the 67 apple devices, 10 of them are related to homicide, 2 to rapes, 1 to a criminal sex acts, and 2 are related to two members of the police department that were shot. so, we are seeing an increase as we go forward of phones not, you know, not getting the information out of the phones. one thing i will say is it doesn't always prevent us from making an arrest. however, it

you mentioned metadata analysis. we had before 215 got yanked a metadata collection program that allowed us to keep a trove of telephonic metadata to be consulted only when we had to run a number that we knew was terrorist relate ared. if, in fact, you limit the use of a database in that way, then you can take advantage of the analytic capability and yet prevent, for example, simply data mining all telephone metadata for the purpose of drawing up a profile of a person or for other purposes as well. it's how you limit your analytic capability, not how you limit data collection. >> yeah, i think that's exactly right. i mean, look at -- analyzing the 4th amendment reasonableness of collection program depends in part on how the information is handled. how it's processed, how it's retained. so the answer to your question is yes, it is relevant to consider how it's handled and analyzed determining whether or not it's lawful at least in the matter of looking at it under a 4th amendment guise. you don't have to look far for

i have heard some say that law enforcement can solve problems using metadata alone.that is simply not true. that is like asking a detective to process a crime scene by only looking at the street address on the outside of the house where a crime was committed. i strongly encourage committee members to contact your state investigative agency or local police department and ask about the challenge. i appreciate your invitation to share my perspective and i am happy to answer questions today or at any point in the future. thank you mister chairman and members of the committee i think the panel , i don't nice i have five minutes for questioning. i think sometimes the fbi's concerns about encryption are broadly characterized as being against encryption. considering the fbi's work on investigations like the sony data breach or the attacks on hospitals, why have a tough time believing your organization is against the technology that's so instrumental to protecting digital information so to clarify, does the fbi agree that strong encryption is important to the privateers of ou

alexander: exactly what has occurred with the data program, the metadata program.rogram, all of the information goes into a vault, and the government can only look into it when it can prove it is involved with a terrorist group. emily: has that data actually stopped attacks? gen. alexander: it has. i am not just for trampling over andody's to make haitians stuff. i am for a reasonable approach. it is interesting that -- jeff stone did not like this program either. he is on one side and i would be on the other, theoretically. what he came to was let's move is atta so the -- so it the service providers. and when the government goes to look at it, we can audit, as we did, every time the government looks at it. those audits were available for the courts, congress, and the administration to look at. they found out that the only times that nsa looked at it was when it was associated with terrorists, period. nsa did was reported to the courts, congress, and administration, just as we were responsible for doing. my question is how did you get from a metadata program to we

general alexander: exactly what has occurred with the data program, the metadata program.n that program, all of the information goes into a vault, and the government can only look at it when it can prove it is related to al qaeda or a terrorist group. you don't see yours or mine unless you talk to a terrorist. emily: has that data actually stopped attacks? general alexander: it has. i am not just for trampling over anybody's communications and stuff. i am for a reasonable approach. it is interesting that -- jeff stone did not like this program either. i use that, because, remember, i would be on one side, and he would be on the other, the oretically. and what he came to was let's prove the data so it is at the service providers." and when the government goes to look at it, we can audit, as we did, every time the government looks at it. so those audits were available for the courts, congress, and the administration to look at. which is what the review group looked at, and low and behold, they found out that the only times that nsa looked at it was when it was associated wit

the metadata alone does not matter.it is the content of communication, the images that were sent and received. >> if you cannot get these encrypted images and the encrypted discussion, what do you have in court? >> nothing. >> how do you find a victim? >> often times we don't have a way. >> can you please talk to us more about what it is you do to find the victim? >> everything we can. we look for legal solutions, trying to identify them through the app. the challenge we find is because of retention periods the records no longer exist, and then we tried to get the communication and often times we are not able to because of encryption. >> when you find one of these their usual thousands of villages involving multiple victims. >> encrypted clouds or sites >> to you please expand on what you previously started to answer, potential solution. >> find a better firewall. think of that is the doors to the bank. while you think of the actual lock on the bank deposit boxes and encryption those firewalls can be opened up, but if w

you mentioned metadata analysis. we had, before, you know, 215 got yanked a metadata collection program that allowed us a keep a trove of telefonic metadata to be consulted only when we had to run a number that we knew was terrorist-related. if in fact you limited use of a data base in that way, then you can take advantage of the analytic capability and yet, prevent, for example, simply data mining all telephone metadata for purpose of drawing a profile of a person or for other purposes as well. but it is how you limit your analytic capability, not, not how you limit data collection. >> yeah. i think that is exactly right. look at, look at, analyzing the fourth amendment reasonableness of a collection program depends in part on how the information is handled, how it is reprocessed, how it is analyzed, how it is retained. answer to your question is yes, it is relevant to consider how information is handled and analyzed in determining whether or not it is law full at least as a matter of looking at it under fourth amen

spee metadata should state but the delegation said they prefer to educate instead of litigate. >> i am not a constitutional lawyer but it doesn't seem to me but is a promotion of any specific religion. there should be a, . [laughter] by the way this is what it looks like. >> you cannot predict the outcome of the election. is now going viral. aha! oof! weee! slurp. mmmmmm. cinnamon toast crunch. crunch! crave those crazy squares. >> talk about road rage. weaving in and out of traffic. go paperless, don't stress, girl i got the discounts that you need safe driver accident-free everybody put your flaps in the air for me go paperless, don't stress, girl i got the discounts that you need accident-free everybody put your flaps in the air for me i can't lip-synch in these conditions. savings oh, yeah good morning, this is your captain speaking. it's a beautiful day with sunny skies and a light tailwind out of the northeast. blue skies smiling at me nothing but blue skies do i see the new jetblue card. it's like having jetblue with you wherever you go. get three times points on jetblue purchas

spee metadata should state but the delegation said they prefer to educate instead of litigate. >> i amot a constitutional lawyer but it doesn't seem to me but is a promotion of any specific religion. look at the lack of grammar there should be a, . [laughter] by the way this is what it looks like. >> you cannot predict the outcome of the election. is now going viral. >> talk about road rage. weaving in and out of >> talk about road rage. weaving in and out of traffic. ♪ i've been a turkey farmer my whole life... and i raise turkey for shady brook farms®. we don't use growth-promoting antibiotics, that's just the way things should be done. that's important to me. my name is glenn, and i'm an independent turkey farmer. (female announcer) shady brook farms®. no growth-promoting antibiotics, just honest, simple turkey. rage video out of florida. in repeatedly being chased down by a ford fusion in and out of traffic and at one point goes against traffic over 100 miles per hour. he does admit to hitting the mir however he may have taken it all little far by trying to run down the car. he tri

and we have the metadata, but it is all a physical format. that is what keeps me awake at night. [laughter] archive, a very comprehensive -- but in physical format. >> [inaudible] 40,000 hours of cultural programs from 1972 to 1986. we don't have copies of that either. cannot -- [indiscernible] i could just add that part of the reason you find the npr collection and multiple locations is because of its quasigovernmental history. the fact that a lot of its funding did come from the feds in the beginning. l.o.c. was involved, but as npr moved further away from being a ward of the federal government, they looked for other solutions to their archiving problem. emptyately we had an basement in maryland. [laughter] the end of our time. i would like to thank all of our panelists. time for lunch. [applause] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> interested in "american history tv"? visit our website. c-span.org/history. you can see

cohen: the metadata alone, who was talking to him does not matter.is the content of the communication, the images sent and received. rep. brooks: if you cannot get these encrypted images and encrypted discussions, what do you have in court? capt. cohen: we have nothing in court. we cannot complete the investigation. rep. brooks: how do you find the victim? capt. cohen: often, we cannot identify the victims and they go unserved. rep. brooks: can you talk more about what it is that you actually do to find the victims? capt. cohen: we do everything we can. we try to look for legal solutions, trying to get records of providers from the technology companies, trying to identify them through that. the challenges we have encountered there many times is because of retention periods, the data, the metadata, no longer exists. we try to get the committee kaisha and to show who was talking to who, often we cannot do that because of encryption. > is in that comment that when you find one of the phones, there are usually thousands of images? capt. cohen: hundreds o

. >> analyzing metadata. >> no one is listening to your telephone calls. john: both are true.are just gathering, looking for patterns, and may be able find a will find a terrorist that way. >> but that reveals a lot about you. >> maybe they will find someone who wants to kill us >> but this program has been wholly ineffective at doing that. it does not keep us safe. john: congress has kind of taking your side at least saying that the phone companies have to hold the data. >> exactly true, and and i was on the right side of history here. john: why is it less problematic? >> the phone company has records of certain customers they don't have everyone's record in one database. they are not going to look up her records, but someone who may be on their radar, and the political party not favor by the government, they can learn a lot. it is who has the information that matters, and the government is powerful. john: this is expensive. good for you for fighting what you believe in. coming up, where you work? are there notices like these posted? they are not they're because workers areea

and the metadata collection, you all have probably heard of this on the news wh the nsa, but i just wanted to note that this actually had been going on in the '90s with the dea where they were collecting telephone metadata for drug cartels or assumed drug dealers. this is actually not as new as we thought it was or not as post-9/11 as we thought it was. these are some of the things that our police and federal agents are doing. many of them are things that have been happening continue to happen the african-american community. the use of informants, sting operations. we do have racial and ethnic mapping has become institutionalized and the fbi will tell you this is not racial profiling. we're just trying to understand the community. we just want to know the beat that we police. the problem is when you look on the other end of that black box and you see the prosecutions and you see that the identities are kinlt consistent of a particular racial and religious group, it's hard to take that statement as a good-faith statement. and then we've also seen through litigation, when there is litigation

good example, metadata analysis, another good example. does improvement in analytic capabiliti capabilities ounces methodology? >> i think couldn't it ounccou s is the metadata collection program that allowed us to keep a trove of telephonak metadata when consulted when we had a run-in number that we knew was terrorist related. in fact, we limit the use of the database in that way, then you can take advantage of the analytic capability, and yet prevent, for example, simply data minding all data for profiles of a person or for other purposes as well. but it's how you only your analytic capability, not how you limit data collection. >> yeah, i think that's exactly right. i mean, look at -- analyzing the fourth amendment out of the collection program depends on part how the information is -- how it's reprocessed. how it's analyzed. how it's taken. so to answer your question, yes, it is relevant to consider how information is handled or analyzed in terms whether or not it's lawful, at least looking at it under the fourth amendment. i do think

[applause] >> this is always the argument and no evidence that with all the metadata that's being collected. 110 million verizon users being monitored, that there has ever been an instance of thwarting an act of terrorism. so this is always the question, this is always the hypothetical but just doesn't exist, and if we create, look, it's one thing to open up one phone, but i'm siding with apple that they can't just do that. they have to provide a master key and if they did that, it could be the immediate death sentence if the chinese government got ahold of that, when it comes to a lot of chinese citizens. [ applause ] >> all right, moving on. you all support the second amendment. individual's right to own a gun, but some people with criminal records some, mentally ill people get guns, some commit terrible crimes. should there be any limit, mr. -- governor johnson? >> i think we should be open to a debate and a discussion over limiting guns to mentally ill. but i haven't heard an argument -- [booing] . >> we should be open to that. we should be open to it, but i got to tell you that i haven

i have heard some say law enforcement can solve crimes using metadata alone. that is not true.hat is like asking a detective to process a crime scene by only looking at the street address on the outside of the house where a crime was committed. i strongly encourage committee members to contact your state investigative agency or local police department and ask about this challenge. i greatly appreciate your invitation to share my perspective and i'm happy to answer questions today or any point in the future. thank you, mr. chairman, members of the committee. >> i now recognize myself five minutes for questions. ms. hess, i think sometimes the fbi's concerns about encryption are characterized as being against encryption. considering the fbi's work on investigations like the sony data breach or the ransom wear attacks on hospital, i have a tough time believing your sorgs against a technology that's against protecting information. does the fbi agree strong inscription is important to the security and privacy of our citizens and strength of national security? >> yes, sir. >> and it

and opinion leaders, leaders of government and state criticizing the national security agency for metadataollection. you don't hear any criticism. now europeans see how necessary it is to prevent these attacks. david: chris, i have one question quick. i mean quick. that they are producing something called octogen. i understand very highly explosive material used to detonate nuclear weapons s that a concern or should be a concern to us? >> it's a huge concern concern. part of nuclear weapons program. in shocking turn of developments. iran is unrib negotiating partner. beyond parody that they are maintaining the joint plan of nuclear agreement. i think it will fail within months, beyond pair roadie. guideway to bit it. chris harmer. >> secretary of state john kerry making surprise visit to baghdad. to reassure iraqi leaders that the u.s. remains committed to the government and military. kerry pledging $155 million more in support and humanitarian aid to help the country. while the u.s. and iraqi military prepare a final assault to take key city of mosul from isis. david: government is not ap

they probably looked at the existing metadata which corresponds, and the taxi driver as being debriefed. they probably do have some sources, you know, witnesses to this that are talking that they would prefer not to disclose because they are in danger. and so they are taking this step by step. i'm starting to be impressed by the belgians, they are finally getting it together and you know, again, it as we talked about they are knocking down doors and getting physical evidence, exactly what you want to do. >> so fred, he was, abrini, was on the run since he was seen in that video before the paris attacks. and then he was able to go on and be part of the second attack. do we know what led authorities to him to make that arrest yesterday? >> reporter: well, it's unclear what exactly led to them but it was a raid that took place inside an apartment, right near the place where he was finally apprehended. i spent the better part of yesterday evening at that location. and amarntly what happened they raided an apartment which they believe might have been an apartment he was using for a considera

we had to grapple with digital storage, naming conventions, and capturing all of the metadata associated so we can find it later. as we've physically created the inventory we also had to create policies and guidelines around its existence. we of course looked to other institutions that had established best practices. our current situation is different ban a few years ago. we have a lot more items that you m.d. available to the public for research. a rich history. we had volunteers into interns work with us on inventory projects and we have at least two collections fully inventoried and several more partially inventory. that time toate at create the archive from our internal partners and we capitalized on that so we can find the historical record for npr and move forward. some of the lessons we wanted to share with you because i am sure a lot of your institutions are looking at historical archives, whether they are previously created or not. to identify institutional memories within the organization. people were help all and giving us names of others to talk to or others are at cap aims t

so the information, the data that law enforcement has access to, is certainly much more than the metadata that they've had over the past several years. but now as applications go into the cloud, those providers need to access the data. the sensitive information is not just on your iphone or other device. it's sitting in the cloud and law enforcement has access because it cannot be encrypted. it needs to be accessed by the cloud provider in order to do the sophisticated processing and power pashtun and provide the insight. >> my time is expired. >> thank you. i see no of the members of the subcommittee that are with us, we condemn -- >> mr. chairman? >> i'm sorry. you're on the subcommittee speak was no. >> we are going, not on the subcommittee so now we're going to members who have been given privilege to speak. i was advised i was to go to the other side, like a ping pong game, ms. eshoo, your five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all to mr. yoran. i love your suit and tie. [laughter] it brings a little of the flavor of my district into this big old hearing room, and warm we

so the information, the data that law enforcement has access to is certainly much more than the metadata that they have had over the past several years. but now as applications go to the cloud, the cloud application providers need to access the data. so the sensitive information is not just on your iphone or other device. it's sitting in the cloud, and law enforcement has access there because it cannot be encrypted. it needs to be accessed by the cloud provider in order to do the sophisticated processing and provide the insight to the consumer that they're looking for. >> my time has expired. i have to yield back. >> thank you. and no other members of the subcommittee that are with us, we can then -- >> mr. chairman. >> i'm sorry. >> okay. you're on the subcommittee? >> no. >> we're going, none of the subcommittee so now we're going to members who have been given privileges to speak. i was advised to go to the other side. your five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, to mr. yoran, i love your suit and tie. it brings a little of the flavor of my district into this big old h

so the information, the data that law enforcement has access to is certainly much more than the metadata that they have had over the past several years. but now as applications go to the cloud, the cloud application providers need to access the data. so the sensitive information is not just on your iphone or other device. it's sitting in the cloud, and law enforcement has access there because it cannot be encrypted. it needs to be accessed by the cloud provider in order to do the sophisticated processing and provide the insight to the consumer that they're looking for. >> my time has expired. i have to yield back. mr. chairman: thank you. seeing no other members of the subcommittee that are with us, we can then -- >> mr. chairman? mr. chairman: i'm sorry. you're on the subcommittee? no. none of the subcommittee so now we're going to members who have been given privileges to speak. i was advised to go to the other side. your five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, to mr. yoran, i love your suit and tie. [laughter] >> it brings a little of the flavor of my district into thi

and the metadata collection this happened for drug cartels or assumed drug dealers. this is actually not as post-9/11 as we thought it was. these are some of the things that our police and our federal agents are doing. many of them are things that have been happening, continue to happen to the african-american community. the use of informants undercover agents sting operations. racial mapping has become institutionalized. the fbi will say this is not racial profiling, we're just trying to understand the community. we just want to know the beat that we police. the problem is when you look on the other end of that black box and you see the prosecutions and see that the identities are consistently of a particular racial and religious group, it's hard to take that statement as a good faith statement. then we've also seen through litigation -- there is litigation and the nypd just settled a case of mass surveillance of muslim communities where they sent in informants and undercover agents into mosques. many of them had been infiltrated and all that is going into intellige