de gaulle now de gaulle had not now de gaulle had not assumed , that. de gaulle was convinced that when push came to shove, khrushchev would not use force. khrushchev, before vienna, tells his colleagues, once we sign a peace treaty with east germany, we are not going to make the mistake that stalin made in 1948 and 1949. we are not going to allow the west to use the air corridors to continue to supply west berlin. we are going to shoot down a british or american plane to send a signal that the air corridors are closed. did notnow, de gaulle predict that. kennedy did. and kennedy's thinking was, we must engage to give the russians theyse that if they choos choose diplomacy over militarized conflict, something good will come out of it. so in 1961, without having access to the internal discussions of the bureau, because the cia never penetrated the presidium, kennedys deep penetrated the presidium, kennedy's deep sense of politicians led him to make a different call then de gaulle. now i will give you an aside on , kennedy in relation to khrushchev. if yo

unfortunately, there was a problem — the french president charles de gaulle was strongly opposed.s, juliet campbell, was a british diplomat at the time. archive footage: a staggering blow is dealt to western unity in this council hall in brussels, when france blackballs britain from the common market. # charles de gaulle may be ten feet tall # and think he's napoleon. # but the french wash every three days, on bidets. # so thank god for english men and not common market # not common market scum.# the british people, who had only slowly came around to the idea that perhaps we were going into the eec, were really very shocked. with communication between countries half a world apart nowadays only a few hours, it compels new thinking along the economic front. so in 1961, the british government applied to join the european communities. and edward heath was appointed. i have just come from making a full statement to the members of the european economic community. in that statement, i explained that the united kingdom government wished to take its full part in working for a better europe

. # 0h, de gaulle maybe 10 feet tall and think he's napoleon. # but the french wash every three days— not common market — # not common market scum! the british people, who had only slowly come round to the idea that perhaps we were going into the eec, were really very shocked. with communication between countries half a world apart, nowadays 110 more than a matter of hours, the shrinking world makes nonsense of frontiers, forms ever—larger units, compels new thinking along the economic front. so 1961, the british government applied to join the european communities and edward heath was appointed. i have just come from making a full statement to the members of the european economic community. in that statement, i explained that the united kingdom government wished to take its full part in working today for a closer european unity. the negotiations then moved to brussels and this was the point at which i got added to the british negotiating delegation. the idealism that one found in brussels back then amongst the six was contagious, actually, and i think all of us who were there were co

even back at the start, people realised that de gaulle, who had become president of france, had graveery, very different. the six on the whole were trading amongst themselves whereas britain's pattern was much more outward looking and in particular, we traded a lot with the commonwealth countries and, of course, they had become extremely dependent on this. i suppose the one one thinks of above all is new zealand sheep meat, because the new zealand market was always totally dependent on britain back then. when we came back to brussels in january after the christmas break, there was quite a lot of worry about where de gaulle's position had now reached, whether he was going to veto the british membership and attention focused on a press conference that he was due to give in the middle ofjanuary. he was saying, "we must ask ourselves, is britain really ready?" i think we knew in our heart of hearts that he really was saying that he wasn't going to let us in. france's stated reason for denying britain membership is over differences in the agricultural policy. that final negotiation in that

this photograph was given to harry truman by general charles de gaulle during a visit to washington,.c., and it was during this visit that truman told de gaulle that he would not oppose a return to france to vietnam. >> so this photograph is 1945. does the u.s. have any interest in vietnam at this time? >> not in particular, their interest is moe of supporting france as a bull work against communism in europe because of course, there's great concern about communism spreading there. so the feeling that was we need to support france and france really felt that it needed to return to indo-china as it called it. >> and this was early in the truman administration. let's go next to the eisenhower administration, and you can show us some things there. >> okay. this exhibit is broken down into 12 different chapters. we're seeing some of the highlights, obviously. how long did it take you to assemble the archive documents and collect everything that you needed to put it together? >> it took over two years, and i had a lot of help. i invited several, almost two dozen prominent historians to su

vichy france, or under de gaulle? >> i was going to say the de gaulle parades are note worthy.y after the war. that's sort of the impression one has in their minds. but i would say that the -- that nazi occupiers were just better at parades generally. >> yeah, that's a tough one. i don't think -- i won't wade too far into that. what we have a divide between the two parts of the river, the potomac cuts through washington. culturally the pentagon is very pro-military. you have a lot of pickup trucks in the parking lot. here they don't see it as a big deal. the view here is we do parades all the time, in small towns. what's the big fuss about? that's partly why they confirmed this story so quickly last night. right? "washington post" story hits about 6:10 last night. the pentagon confirmed pretty quickly yeah, we're working on it. normally when you have conversations, and directives that are given to the pentagon in the tanks, they're very, very difficult to get a readout and they don't always tell you what happened. this wasn't the case. they said yeah we're looking at it and we'

even back at the start, people realised that charles de gaulle had grave doubts about edition three. the six were trading among themselves. the pattern of britain was outward looking. in particular, we traded a lot with the commonwealth countries, and, of course, they had become extremely dependent on this. there was a lot of worry about where the french resident's position had reached, whether he was going to veto british men bishops. —— president. —— membership. attention focused on a press conference he was going to give in the middle ofjanuary. he was seen we give in the middle ofjanuary. he was seen we must give in the middle ofjanuary. he was seen we must ask give in the middle ofjanuary. he was seen we must ask ourselves, is britain really ready. i think we needin britain really ready. i think we need in our heart of hearts that he was really saying he was not going to let us in the good the reason stated by france is over differences in agricultural policy. that final negotiation, the long room with the british delegation at the far end, the french chatting among themselves a

. >> somewhat more narrower point, it sounds, tim, as if you're saying de gaulle's advice would apply to north korea, and sort of connected to that, i'm wondering in retrospect to what exat the present time eisenhower came close in his dealings with khrushchev to taking de gaulle's advice. compared to kennedy. to be sure, eisenhower did let himself be pressured into having the visit to the united states by khrushchev and the summit in paris in april 1960 because he was worried but i don't think eisenhower produced the same impression on khrushchev as the bay of pigs and kennedy's behavior at the summit in vienna which you didn't take all that seriously. that is, i think kennedy did strike khrushchev as a kind of immature, young man who might be pushed around in ways that eisenhower with all of his seniority, maturity and military background might not. >> i don't think you should ever debate with a pulitzer prize winning biographer. bill, all i'll say is that in the transcripts of the polyb rit sessions, khrushchev describes kennedy as being the same as eisenhower. we can have this dis

what a couple have said in the earlier panel and that is that we were not thinking of europe as de gaulle, divided into three parts. we were thinking in terms as president bush and he said, a europe that was whole and free. those countries in between, the in between countries, had suffered under the third reich only to be liberated by the red army so that they might suffer under stalin and his successors, for the next 40 years. i would have been actually a trim jeopardy if we let them stay in what we thought of as a strategic vacuum. those ex-warsaw pact nations would not have been able to be taken into the european union without the nato security umbrella. if the central europeans were left in the strategic limbo, they would very likely have rearmed to the disadvantage of their economies, they might have very well have resurrected territorial claims on their neighbors, with their neighbors, and basically thrown that part of europe into conflict and kay yoes. furthermore, the u.s. and our allies did everything possible to convince post soviet russia that it was not a target for deterrence