barbara slaven from the atlantic council. i would be interested in your government's evaluation of the current strength of the opposition forces within syria. we have seen some unprecedented attacks just yesterday and today on installations near damascus. i believe a republican guard facility and also a television station. do you think that this conflict is going to reach a tipping point and what more is turkey prepared to do to help the opposition? thank you. >> i think first, we should all know that there is no quick solution. no quick solution to all those problems. this is a big, big challenge. there are no magical formulas, unfortunately. so we have to keep this in mind and then work together, all together, for the opposition in order to have a legitimate opposition, we need that opposition to be inclusive. it should represent all segments of society because it is a sectarian country, so i think we should be very careful in working with the opposition to advise them that they should take every necessary step in order to

>> barbara slaven from the atlanta council. pleasure to see you again. i wanted you to talk just a little bit about the relationship that has developed with the russians in the arms control process, and the russians have putin now again as president. how do you see cooperation over iran developing? do you see that this arms control process might bleed into other issues with the russians, or are you a little concerned that putin may play the nationalism card a little harder than medvedev did? thanks. >> as far as russian policy is concerned, i see a great deal of consistency, quite frankly. if you're interested in the official russian articulation of their policy, it's very useful to look at, first of all, the remarks that putin published -- they were published under his name in some of the top newspapers, right before the election. also, he put out an election platform. and since that time, he has -- his administration has published a foreign policy, their first foreign policy statement of policy, after he entered into the presidency. and there's an emph

our second speaker is barbara slaven who specializes on iran as a non-resident senior fellow at the atlantic counsel, a public policy scholar at the woodrow wilson scholars and an author and she was assistant managing editor for world and national security at the washington times and in 2008 and 2009 and prior to that she served for 12 years as senior diplomatic reporter for "u.s.a. today" where she covered such key issues as the u.s. led war aterrorism in iraq, policy towards rogue states and accompanied three secretaries of state on official travels and reported solo from iran, israel, egypt, north korea, saudi arabia and syria. our third speaker is alaraza nader, senior internal policy analyst and research focused iran's political dynamics, leads decision making and iranian foreign policy. he raises publications include coping with a nuclearizing iran, israel and iran, a dangerous rivalry, the next supreme leader, succession in the republic of iran, saudi rain an relations and many others. this commentaries have appeared in a varied of media including foreign policy, global security.org,

barbara slaven from the atlantic council.im, i want to get you to talk a little bit more about what would not be small bore, because the conventional wisdom has been that if you can resolve the 20 president issue that calms the israelis down, they're most worried about 20%, and they're most worried about fordo. so why is that not a good area to begin in return for some sanctions relief of that the iranians would get, something better than what's been put on the table so far? thanks. >> yeah, it's a great question, and that is where the conventional wisdom is, and i agree. 20% is the most urgent near-term priority from a non-proliferation stand point, no doubt about it. and you're right to say that it's part of the whole red line talk shifting in vague red line talk of the israelis. they're focused on fordo. but since you raise fordo, the u.s. position as i understand it is they want it disabled. not simply freezen or not -- frozen or not operating, but disabled. i think that's going to be a tough pill for the iranians to acce

. -- barbara slaven from the atlantic's council. obviously, obama does not want to get involved until after the elections, but life could intervene. what if the regime uses chemical weapons against its own people? we have seen reports that they are moving chemical weapons around. if there is a mass atrocity, what should the response be and what would the response be? >> obviously, public sentiment drives policy to a certain degree. these would create a groundswell of sympathy and horror at what the regime is doing. it is already quite developed. can america improve the situation? this is really unknown. if you do send a cruise missile into his palace and begin to hunt him down like you did gaddafi and altman to kill him, how long will that take? -- and ultimately kill him, how long will that take? and then the big question is, does the death rate go up? if it does, then we can say, we have achieved our strategic goal, which is to hurt iran, and we can go home now. that is a little bit like what we have done in other places. that wou

. -- barbara slaven from the atlantic's council. obviously, obama does not want to get involved until after the elections, but life could intervene. what if the regime uses chemical weapons against its own people? we have seen reports that they are moving chemical weapons around. if there is a mass atrocity, what should the response be and what would the response be? >> obviously, public sentiment drives policy to a certain degree. these would create a groundswell of sympathy and horror at what the regime is doing. it is already quite developed. can america improve the situation? this is really unknown. if you do send a cruise missile into his palace and begin to hunt him down like you did gaddafi and altman to kill him, how long will that take? -- and ultimately kill him, how long will that take? and then the big question is, does the death rate go up? if it does, then we can say, we have achieved our strategic goal, which is to hurt iran, and we can go home now. that is a little bit like what we have done in other places. that wou

. -- barbara slaven from the atlantic's council. obviously, obama does not want to get involved until after the elections, but life could intervene. what if the regime uses chemical weapons against its own people? we have seen reports that they are moving chemical weapons around. if there is a mass atrocity, what should the response be and what would the response be? >> obviously, public sentiment drives policy to a certain degree. these would create a groundswell of sympathy and horror at what the regime is doing. it is already quite developed. can america improve the situation? this is really unknown. if you do send a cruise missile into his palace and begin to hunt him down like you did gaddafi and altman to kill him, how long will that take? -- and ultimately kill him, how long will that take? and then the big question is, does the death rate go up? if it does, then we can say, we have achieved our strategic goal, which is to hurt iran, and we can go home now. that is a little bit like what we have done in other places. that wou