everybody who worked in the former iraqi government was a baathist. we legislated anarchy in that country. third decision was to disband the iraqi army, and, again, what we did was we helped to quale the an or kick -- anarchy because without an army the iraqi people and the new government had no way of enforcing their laws, and on top of that, we put most of the country out of work. the fallujah brigade was at best questionable, and i believe most of the elements of the fallujah brigade were actually working with the enemy. in the summer of 2003, the em policemennation of the flew ya -- implementation of the fallujah brigade was a failure. they wanted to clear the city, but the generals were restrained. it was just not in the cards for general mattis to command the operation that would clear fallujah. given the opportunity, he certainly would have gone in and done that. in september of 2003, excuse me, 2004, general, then major general patonski came to fallujah in anbar province and assumed position. in that point in time in the history of iraq, it ha

iraq that put the bath party in power the cia specifically supported a young twenty five year old baathist by the name of saddam hussein providing him with a list of his enemies including seven hundred communists and democrats to be eliminated a bloodbath in syria. anyways house to plan the overthrow of d.m. less than a month before j.f.k. himself was murdered bobby kennedy way said vietnam might not be so easy and one is about the wisdom of putting someone they hardly know in charge of such an important country. in the course of the miers ambassadorship which had been agreed to be last just one year i dealt with fire government in other words the house was clean turned over five different times for the chaos that one can imagine while the national security council was busy replacing vietnamese governments right and extreme right l.b.j. acted like he was the victim in this thing the. we're in johnson and johnson the room where it even was the instability of the south vietnamese government i guess you might call the coat of arms of the vietnamese government turnstile for god's sake and i re

in egypt what will come after president mubarak is open to question the public opinion agency the baathists and also russians who is responsible for middle east instability twenty percent cited the united states fourteen percent blame islamic fundamentalists eight percent believe it's israel and six percent see western countries at fault with the unrest all around the region what does the future hold for egypt's people. now bill i think it's really quite interesting isn't it we've all kind of hinted it's either been direct or indirect in this program everybody's surprised about a democratizing arab world while you know it's as if you know you know we've been told repeatedly that it's not possible they have to be helped to they have to go through these stages a straw man you know all of this we've been fed in. dictatorships in pursuit of american foreign policy and for american foreign policy interests now that is very much in danger and we have another leader who could be on the lam very very quickly where that person goes we don't know but that has to send a signal to the other dictators t

>> baathist then the response in local areas each time we have seen it -- that has been the response in local areas each time we have seen it, so that is why we think they're going to do it again this year. how we protect against that is a combination of things we are doing. we are going to continue to protect the leadership, build a forces, and mobilize the people as fast and effectively as we can to make all of them part of the solution. >> last week, general arnold fields and testified before the commission of wartime contrasting -- contracting. he said that the infrastructure is lagging. many soldiers are out there was no place tuesday. what is your perception? -- no place to stay. what is your perception of that? >> i have not seen that in the field, but that would be a question for general caldwell. >> my impression from hearing you is that pakistan does not need to go in northwest to ensure u.s. success if you grow afghan security forces at the pace your growing them. >> again, we are going to encourage them to do more because that makes it easier with what we are doing. i thi