please expand on that. >> dugway followed the procedures that were in place at dugway. as frank said, what happened was, the procedures were the culprit. we believe they were indicators that people should have known there was a problem. that is why we can say there is nobody that was doing it on purpose. they were following what they believed to be the correct protocol. it was responsible -- it was the responsibility of the laboratory to identify the problem. i do not believe there is any contradiction in our testimony here. as i said, there were different procedures in each of the facilities. they were all in different chains of command. one of the findings was, that we need to standardize and activation protocol across all four of the laboratories in that is what secretary kendall will have to do. there is no deadline. frank kendall has as much time to do this and the moratorium will stay in place for as long as is needed. at some point, if it becomes clear that it is interfering with our biological defense program, secretary kendall will take that into account. his f

>> dugway followed the procedures that were in place in dugway, as far as we know. that's based on just a 30-day review. as frank said, what happened were the procedures were the primary culprit. we believe there were indicators that people should have known there was a problem. so, that is why there is -- we can say that there was nobody who was doing it on purpose. they were following what they considered to be the correct protocol. but it was the responsibility of the laboratory to figure out whether those protocols were correct. that is what the investigation will tell us. so i don't see there's any -- i don't see there's any contradiction in our position here. >> are they the same at dugway as they are at the other facilities? >> yes, they were. as i said, there were different procedures in each of the facilities. they were all in different chains of commands. and one of the findings was, we need to discover a dod activation protocol across all four of the laboratories and that's undersecretary kendall has to do. to your point, there is no deadline. frank kenda

two of our cases involve dugway. in april 2007 dugway shipped anthrax or research facility.he research facility tested material and found the presence of a low concentration of viable anthrax. we found dugway ignored the results of the inactivation viability test which showed viable anthrax was present. later in november 2010 government laboratory received a shipment that included a file. small amounts of this are exempt from the regulations. packing slip indicated the file contained an exact amount but in fact a shipment included a regulated amount. the dugway than self-reported to whether an operation is that the select agent. as a federal entity, dugway presents an enforcement challenge for oig. any cmp under federal entity would shift money the government at a cost to taxpayers and may not promote better compliance. consistent with the approach with other federal entities, oig issued notice of violation letters for both cases. both letters dated oig had determined dugway violated regulations and should examine current policies and practices take corrective action and mon

>> it was dugway. they developed -- >> who is over dugway? who do they fall underneath, mr. hassell, mr. sosin, dr. dempske. >> who oversees dugway. >> the army. >> help me figure out who is responsible fb who's the chain of command that's responsible for the death certificate for the procedures to show that the agents leaving is truly dead? >> are you talking about the chain of command at the laboratory -- >> i'm talking about the chain in command to find out that the anthrax that is shipping out -- this isn't is hard question. who is over finding out for sure the procedures to find that the agent is dead? >> it would be -- >> you don't know? >> it would be the scientist at dugway. >> dr. sosin can you answer that question? >> i can't answer -- >> dr. sempski b edempske can you answer that question? >> not specifically. >> i couldn't figure it out either. there is so many people that touch this there is no clear line of chain of command. this goes back to a line of questions that was already asked. no one can be fired because no one takes responsibility because no one has r

dugway, it did not. we believe we know why. there's a combination of large production volume, low sampling volume on the testing for inactivation material for viability testing and there was a very short period of time between the time dugway irradiated the sample and declared it dead, and the viability test to conclude that it was. >> so there were four dod labs that handle anthrax and dugway is the biggest production one. and at that facility, they found there were problems with the amount of radiation that was used to try to neutralize the anthrax the viability testing that tested afterwards to see if it's really enactive, and then contamination prevention. the fact that they used some of the same equipment to handle live anthrax and supposedly dead anthrax. those all could have been problems, and the next step, army investigation to detect whether there was a failure of leadership. >> it looks like they're blaming the procedures here, and not actual people and does that mean that no one here is going to be held accountable?

dugway they developed that. >> who was over there who default underneath? who oversees dugway?> the army. >> narrow it down to help me figure out who a is responsible that chain of command for the death certificate for the procedures that show the agents are true the dead. >> ben schaede of command in the laboratory? >> to find out if it is shipping out to. though it is over finding of for sure those procedures that the agent is dead? >>. >> you don't know. kenny ransom depression dr. sosin? >> i cannot. >> not specifically. >> this raises my last question during to the background information i could not figure that out. there are so many people that touched this there is no clear line chain of command as a business owner you have to be responsible to no one can be fired because no one takes responsibility because no one has responsibility we just assume everyone is doing their job yet to reship out live anthrax and no one takes responsibility for that? you said you would leave or a lock down so it cannot be shipped one tell you declared a line of command and procedures for go

>> it was dugway. who do they fall? hassle, so some? who oversees dugway? >> army. >> narrowing down for me. help me. help me figure out who is responsible, the chain of command responsible for the death certificate for the procedures that show the agents leaving is truly dead >> the. >> the chain of command of the laboratory. >> the chain of command to find out. this is not a hard question. finding out for sure the procedures defined that the agent is dead. >> it would be -- >> you don't no. >> can you answer that question? >> i cannot. >> can you answer that question? >> not specifically. >> as i was going through the background information i cannot figure it out either. there is no clear line of chain of command. you have to have someone responsible for something. thissomething. this goes back to line of questions that was already asked. no one takes responsibility. we assume everyone is doing there job in here we are shipping out live anthrax? no one takes responsibility for. going to leave it like down where they could not be shipped until you declared

all the suspected samples came from an army bioterror facility in dugway, utah which produces the largest amount of anthrax. the cdc has traced samples to 183 labs across the world and in the u.s.. including maryland, virginia, and the district of columbia. that's more than twice the number previously reported. >> right now, what's causing problem is we just -- it takes days in some cases to determine if any lots that we are testing have any live anthrax in them. >> reporter: the pentagon has ordered the secretary of the army to investigate to determine which individuals are to blame. 31 lab workers are taking antibiotics as a precaution. so far, no one has gotten sick. live in the newsroom, kin chin, station -- chin chip, wusa9. -- surae chinn, wusa9. >>> up next larry miller has another check on the morning commute. >> we're back to live in the '90s today allyson? >> near 90 degrees but most places are going to stay into the upper 80s. it is cool out here. and a beautiful sunrise. cool morning, warm afternoon. we're looking at a nice day with lots of sunshine. how long does it stick aro

they will look at issues specific to dugway but not limiting it to that. it is not just that this can be a better reporting chain. they're may be opportunities that arise. the laboratory that you sent rid. many have capabilities. perhaps it was preventing the free flow of information i am not sure that is the case. getting all the laboratory is working better together standardizing where appropriate and moving forward. >> i guess i would offer this to the gal or oig what existing tools would allow it to better oversee and take corrective actions? >> we have a concern that the reporting is just one level up from the lab and more senior management is not necessarily informed. focused within the laboratory but not necessarily ensuring the accountability of the chain of command is occurring. we are just undertaking work at the request of this committee. the scientific questions how the methods validated. >> i appreciate that. i appreciate your testimony. >> i want to thank the witnesses for coming and really a conversation i had. i am urging him to have a hear