making any changes yourself to the combatant command structure as part of your own review of goldwater-nichols? >> i am thinking about it a lot. i am, had the opportunity to discuss that with the committee and with chairman mccain yesterday and i think i like the chairman and other members of the committee see goldwater-nichols was a great thing. it did a lot of very important things. it established the combatant commanders jointness, lots of other things however, that was an era before there was a big a need as there is now for transregional and transfunctional integration. and so that's an area that couldn't have been foreseen at the time. and that we now see clearly. my own view of that, and i'll be making proposals in the next month and matters affecting what is called the goldwater-nichols basket, many which congress will have to approve, we'll be discussing that with them and hearing their ideas and trying to come up with the best possible ideas for the country going forward, the, i depend on the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to do that integrating.

as part of his goldwater-nichols review senator john mccain has had a number of witnesses before his panel talk about the combatant command structure and several of them said the current structure where you have regional commanders who have control of forces in their specific parts of the world that is not well-suited for today's modern world where threats are increasingly, increasingly global and transcend boundaries. i'm wondering how you think about that problem? and if you're thinking about making any changes yourself to the combatant command structure as part of your own review of goldwater-nichols? >> i am thinking about it a lot. i am, had the opportunity to discuss that with the committee and with chairman mccain yesterday and i think i like the chairman and other members of the committee see goldwater-nichols was a great thing. it did a lot of very important things. it established the combatant commanders jointness, lots of other things however, that was an era before there was a big a need as there is now for transregional and transfunctional integration. and so that's an a

change with regard to goldwater-nichols is number one making sure secretary does have the ability toe decisions in a timely manner and making sure he does have the ability to integrate the joint force in the trans-regional multi-domain multifunction flight. also requires in my estimation the joint staff take a different approach to strategy and to ensure that we write strategies for for example the problems we spoke about today. it's an just an aggregation of operations plans if you're dealing with russia or china that you have a strategic framework in which those operations plans are met and the military strategy needs to be refined to provide the framework and with which all plans are developed to the final piece of that an execution is the secretary's ability to prioritize and allocate resources in a timely manner or by this ongoing in multiple combatant commands at the same time. from my perspective as we think about reform please should focus on the character of war and what reforms are necessary to make sure we can fight in the 21st century and what i've alluded to our fundamen

where do each of you think this needs to go in terms of a revised goldwater-nichols? are we talking about specifically whatever savings we might reap from northcom and southcom or africom being reunited as one? are we talking about greater ambitions in terms of reducing the number of flag and general officers because of the way we're connected now? where do you think this joint force conversation goldwater-nichols 2 will go and if you get there, how much do you think you're actually going to save over? >> mark, do you want to start on that? >> i'm just going to start, because it's a great introduction to our panel next week. csis put out some analysis on all of the testimony that has been produced by the sasc on this question, and i recommend you take a look at that, because the bottom line that comes out is that there's a lot of concern about the agility of the department, including staff, to make strategic decisions, but there's really no consensus about how to bring that about. there are proposals to merge northcom and southcom, maybe put africom back into eucom, b

vago: let me ask you about goldwater nichols. they are more focused on acquisition and strategic reforms. bit about a little some of the proposals on the table and the potential cost implications of some of this. some of them are sweeping potential changes that could have significant cost implications. walk us through on what the views are on some of the things we are hearing right now. guest: i was on the senate staff and sitting on the senate floor for the debate on the weapons acquisition system reform act in 2009. not a stranger to acquisition reform, nor to the impetus that drives us to it. without that bill did a next ordinary job of setting a department on a course which we have benefited from enormously in the last seven years. in the last four years, we've had four violations at the critical level. in the four years before that, we had 18. those are facts that speak for themselves, and they counsel a moderate level of caution. we can improve this process. i think the recent bill introduced by chairman goodberry has kerne

be making proposals in the next month in this and other matters affecting what is called the goldwater nichols basket, many of which congress will have to approve. we'll be discussing that, with them and hearing their ideas. and trying to come up with the best possible ideas for the country going forward. on the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to do that. i do that every day. i depend on them. i would like to strengthen their role in doing that, i don't want to do that anyway that subtracts from their ability to give independent military advice. i don't favor putting the chairman in the chain of command, per se. the chairman -- i watch this every day, the chairman gives me and the president of the united states a very valuable, independent, professional military advice. that is really key. but we can have both of those things at the same time. i expect that to be something where i will be making proposals. also, in areas of acquisition and structure. getting rid of some of our access headquarters, i talked about the details. there will be a number of proposa

goldwater nichols reform is a focus of this committee and i appreciate this.ichols was important, had positive results, but after 30 years, it needs updates. there are some areas where the pendulum may have swung too far, like not involving the service chiefs enough in accountability. there are areas where subsequent events suggest nudging the pendulum further like taking more steps to strengthen the joint chiefs of staff to help address trends regional threats, threats and multiple domains, multiple threads within overlapping timeframe. know, last fall, we begin a comprehensive department-wide review to identify any potential redundancies and other areas of improvement to help formulate dod's recommendations to you. i expect internal findings by the end of march. this work is important on what is within our existing authority to do so. we look forward to working closely with with the needed reforms. as we discussed, i look forward to working with you, senator reid, on this important matter. the defense department doesn't have the luxury of just one opponent o

i know goldwater nicholls reform is a focus of this committee and, chairman, i appreciate that. goldwater/nicholls was important, had deeply positive results, but after 30 years as you've said it needs updates. there are some areas the pendulum may have swung too far like not involving the service chiefs enough in acquisition, decisionmaking and accountability. and there are areas as you've noted where subsequent world events suggest nudging the pendul pendulum further, like taking more steps to strengthen the capability of the chairman and the joint chiefs of staff to help address transregional threats, threats in multiple domains and multiple threats within overlapping time frames. as you know, last fall we began a comprehensive department-wide review of organizational issues like these to identify any potential redundancies, inefficiencies, or other areas of improvement to help formulate d.o.d.'s recommendations to you. i expect its internal findings by the end of march. this work is important. though much is within our existing authority to do so, we look forward to working

as we go through this debate about goldwater-nichols, if it is all about efficiency across the board, some of the problems that have been identified about being more agile, adaptive, and strategically relevant will become second priorities. second bananas. we have to be very clear minded in what the real thrust of this is. >> next question. >> my name is jim berm. i am a retired journalist who covered issues in all of the federal agencies for many years. i just picked up this morning the current issue of the washington examiner magazine. they have a story here. fixing a national security mccainand then it quotes as saying the military's technological advantage is eroding fast, precisely at the time the world is on fire. then it discusses some of the issues you brought up about how attempt is mccain's to upgrade or modernize the goldwater reforms. a, do you think that quote from mccain is on the money or extreme? and what is the outlook to get something out of this effort to upgrade? >> who would like to grade mccain's speech? [laughter] >> mccain generally evokes the attention of jour

one of the things i'm looking at in connection with the goldwater-nichols issue is strengthening thee of the joint chiefs of staff and chairman in precisely this way. we have combatant commanders. they are excellent but focused on particular regions. i look to the chairman and he of this,xcellent job gen. dunford: in november, we asked special operations command to take the lead because they did have connective tissue in each one of our combatant commands. to beginning development of a terrorism plan to counter extremism at large. we most recently had a meeting friday afternoon where i convened the joint chiefs to look at this. critical to that is having a common operational and intel picture. that is the first part. the second is having an assessment process into a single vision the secretary of defense can see. as a secretary alluded to, then a process to make recommendations for the allocation of resources. much like we are trying to provide pressure across isil in iraq and syria, we are trying to do that transregionally at the same time. we are focused on that. you asked about wh

committee will remain the defense reform effort that we began last year, including a review of the goldwater nichols legislation that is now marking its 30th anniversary. over the past year senator reid and the staff and i have held hearings and conducted interviews with dozens of the former former and currently serving military civilian defense leaders including discussions with our distinguished witness today. the result is that i believe that we have a clear definition of the challenge that we must address. the focus is the military's ability to fight as a joint force. the challenge today is the strategic integration and by that i mean improving the ability for department of defense and strategies globally to confront a series of threat. and all of them span multiple regions of the world and numerous military functions. >> we would welcome any thoughts and recommendations that we are prepared to share today. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me join you in welcoming the witnesses. the presidents fiscal year 2017 budget includes nearly $583 billion in discretionary spending. and this amount, 523.9 b

as this committee continues its review of the goldwater-nichols act we're interested to hear our witness witnesses' views whether the current structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of global and transregional threats in the 21st century and what reforms we might consider. this is critical because there are too many obstacles to success as it is. time and again, politically driven strategy, micromanagement and misguided reductions in defense spending have made our military's job more difficult. this has been especially true for our special operations forces. more than 15 years of continuous deployments due in part to an overreliance on their unique capabilities has led to unprecedented stress on the force. as the threats we face impose greater demands on our special operators and their families, we must be vigilant and provide the necessary support to maintain their vital capabilities, not just in direct action, but in building partnership capacity across centcom and afri com. while we marvel at our special operations force we must remember they're just one part

one of the reasons why i'm so committed to working with you up here on the goldwater nichols revisit effort that the chairman and this committee have spearheaded and i am doing also in the department, and want to do with you, is because that is an area where your point which is allocating resources among cocoms in an average, effective way, that's where from my point of view, i would like to strengthen the role of the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman. because different co coms see different things in their regions. they're all deeply expert in their own regions. but somebody needs to put it all together. and give me advice about that. how to synchronize all those forces. i look to the chairmen and joint staffs for that. i would like for them to have more capability and authority to do so. i hope that's part of our effort. with that, let me turn it over to the chm, who happened to be in the region last week. >> i spent last week on this issue, visited southern command, our joint interagency task force and went to columbia. and on the bright side, what i was encouraged by is the

we're doing a survey opening it up to the public for defense reform and looking at goldwater/nicholseforms, the kind of people that come to these events and watch them online may have some strong insights and opinions there. so please go take our survey. we're actually going to release the results of it at an event a week from today here that will be hosted by dr. emory. it includes some of the faces you see here. all right. i will go ahead. i think we're all ready, all miked up. we can get started here. i will briefly introduce each of our panelists here. to my right is shawn brehmly, executive vice president and director of studies at the center of new american security. and formerly served on the national security council and has been an undersecretary for policy in that office as well. and then next on the line is roger zackhiem a visiting fellow at the american enterprise institution and of counsel at the law firm of coughington and berling and has been the -- he has the hill experience to bring to the discussion. then in the middle, andrew hunter who is a senior fellow here in

one of the things that i am looking at in connection with what -- the so-called goldwater/nichols issue is strengthening the role of the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman in precisely this way. the transregional coordination. we have combatant commanders and they are excellent about you they focus on particular regions. i looked to the chairman and he does an excellent job of balancing resources and making sure the different coms are cooperating. that's northcom and the other combat and commanders. >> congressman, to be specific, what we did back in november, we asked the special operation ppo command to take the lead because they had connective tissue in each of our combatant commands to begin development of a transregional terrorism plan and countering violent extrichlism at large. we've been working at that for a couple months now. we had a meeting friday afternoon where i convened the joint chiefs and ale of our combatant commands to look at this. critical to that is having a common operational picture and common intel picture across all of our combat and commands. second is to

one of the things i'm looking at with thetion goldwater-nichols issue is strengthening the role of theoint chiefs of staff and way.man in precisely this we have combatant commanders. they are excellent but focused on particular regions. and heto the chairman doesn't act one job of this, balancing resources making sure they are cooperating, both north com and the other combatant commanders. gen. dunford: in november, we asked special operations command to take the lead because they did have connective tissue in each one of our commitment -- combatant commands. to beginning development of a terrorism plan to counter extremism at large. we most recently had a meeting friday afternoon where i convened the joint chiefs to look at this. critical to that is having a common operational and intel picture. that is the first part. the second is having an process into a single vision the secretary of defense can see. as a secretary alluded to, then a process to make recommendations for the allocation of resources. much like we are trying to provide pressure across isil in iraq and syria, we are tr

is this committee continues its review of the goldwater-nichols act we are interested to hear our witnesses views as to whether the current structure best enables us to succeed in the strategic environment of global and transregional threats and the 21st century and what performance we might consider. this is critical because there are already too many obstacles to success as it is. time and again politically driven strategy micromanagement of misguided reductions in defense spending of made our military's job more difficult rate this has been especially true for our special operations forces. more than 15 years of continuous deployments due in part to to an overreliance on their unique capabilities has led to unprecedented stress on the force. as the threats we face impose greater demands on our special operators and their families, we must be vigilant and provide the necessary support to maintain their vital capabilities not just in direct action but in building partnership for cross centcom and africom. while we marvel at our special operations forces we must remember they are just one p

one of the things that i am looking at in connection with what the so-called goldwater-nichols issue is strengthening the role of the joint chiefs of staff and the chairman in precisely this way, the trans-regional coordination. with combatant commanders. they are excellent but their focus on particular regions. i look to the gym and he doesn't excellent job of this, a policy resources in making sure the different ones are cooperating, northcom any other combatant commanders. >> to be specific what we did back in november we asked special operations command to take the lead. not for special operations perspective but because they did have connective tissue in each one of our combatant commands incapable of doing this. to begin development of a trans-regional terrorism plan encountered violent extremism. we been working at that for a couple of months. we had a meeting on friday afternoon were i can think of the joint chiefs and all combatant commands to look at it. critical to that is having a common operational picture across all of our combatant commands. that's the first part. the