argued that washington slept in the field as he put it in the real winners of the war were generals horatio gateshanael greene. that washington was generally in active during much of that time and clinton was far more and the most devastating thing attack came about almost 75 years ago but is still read by scholars today and many still accepted and it was a study made by clinton's principal biographeral in conjunction with a clinical psychologist. they argued clinton sought power, but he had deep subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he h had. frankly i think the argument is malarkey not that i am of so of the cycle ministry but obviously they cannot put clinton on the couch and talk with him but in addition clinton was behind virtually no private correspondence that would have opened a window. so i think clinton's reputation suffered from that. >> joey is joining us now. [laughter] >> that's okay. [laughter] but i think that study on clinton should be filed in the circular file. he made mistakes. i recognize that in the book. but i think he was a good

but he argued that washington slept in the field and the real winners of the war were generals horatio gatesnael greene. that washington was generally active much of that time and clinton was far more active. the most devastating thing attack or appraisal of clinton came about almost 75 years ago where the scholars today and many still accepted that biographer in conjunction with a clinical psychologist and they argued he saw power but he had deep subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he had frankly i think the argument is malarkey not that i'm a fellow of the science that obviously they cannot put clinton on the couch and talk with him but in addition clinton left behind virtually no private correspondence that would have opened a window to his inner self so i do think clinton's reputation suffered from that. [laughter] but i think that study on clinton should be filed away in the circular file. certainly he made mistakes i recognize that in the book but i think he was a good general and exceedingly good strategist who didn't have much to work wi

that washington slipped in the field as he put it in the real winners of the war were generals horatio gates and nathanael greene, but washington was generally inactive during that time and clinton was far more active and the most devastating thing, most devastating attack or appraisal of clinton came about almost 75 years ago but still read by scholars today and many still accept it and it was a study made by clinton's biographer, principal biographer in conjunction with a clinical psychologist and they argued that clinton sought power, but that he had to leap subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he had. i think frankly the argument is malarkey. not that i am a particular foe of psycho history but in this case they were obviously unable to put clinton on the couch and talk with him, but in addition clinton left behind virtually no private correspondence that would have opened a window to his inner self so i think clinton's reputation suffered from that. there is your kitty. >> this is joey just joining us now. i have closed the door so my cat ca

that washington slept in the field as he put it and the real winners of the war were generals horatio gates and nathaniel green. washington was generally enacted during much of that time in the clinton was far more active and i think that the most devastating thing, the most devastating attack or appraisal came about almost 75 years ago but was still read by scholars today and many still accepted that it was a study made by clinton's biographer in conjunction with a clinical psychologist. but that they had a deep subliminal psychological problems that prevented him from acting on the power that he had and frankly i think the argument is malarkey not that i am a particular photo of the history but they were obviously unable to put clinton on the couch it would have opened up a window to so i think clinton's reputation suffered from that. [inaudible] i closed the door so mine can to get in the room but anyway, i think that study should be filed away. he certainly made mistakes. i recognized that in the book when i think that he was a good general and exceedingly good strategist that didn't ha

. >> i wondered if you would mention horatio gates as a british officer and always suspected conspiring with as the commander in chief and then defeated himself by wallace at the battle of camden pretty much destroying the army in the south. and famously took up on his horse which led to battlefields i ways found a very cruel they estimated the pace at which he must have led. that was quite a pace for a man of his age. >> hamilton at the time leading very young man but they were our liability to the british into that saratoga campaign. >> yes. my assessment of the german troops is, i think they did a solid job. the german commander was a solid commander. i think a lot of that is the ex post facto blame game. even before his surrender he places a lot of the blame on the german troops. i think he is grasping at straws at that point. of course to find about that a month later and he is incensed because nobody said anything to him about troops performing poorly they were a solid contingent of truth but for instance in the battle of bennington you could call it the bennington campaign. but t

an army by horatio gates. it was the fourth american army in 20 months that had been destroyed in the southern theater. more than 8000 american troops had been killed, wounded or captured on those four engagements. that is the same month that washington writes that letter i almost ceased to hope. it is the same moment that arthur lee and boston is saying many of the leaders in massachusetts now believe the war is going to end with a negotiated settlement short of independence. they would argue we arnold finally makes his final decision to turncoat he may very well have believed the americans goose was cooked. the british were going to win the war on there trying to get on the winning side. having said all of that is speculative. nobody really knows what was going on and arnold's mind. >> i do like you put them in the context of all of the decision-making for is not an impetuous mood for him to suddenly switch sides. it really could've been anyone in a similar position and terms of rank or opportunity. i did ap

scored a huge victory over an american army at camden in south carolina, an army commanded by horatio gates was the fourth american army in 20 months that had been destroyed in the southern theater, and more than 8,000 american troops had been killed, wounded or captured in those four engagements. that's the same month that washington writes that letter saying i've almost ceased to hope, and it is the same month that arthur lee in boston is saying that many of the leaders in massachusetts now believe the war's going to end in a negotiated settlement, short of independence, so i think you can argue that when arnold finally makes his final decision to turncoat in august of 1780, he may very well have believed that the americans' goose was cooked and that the british were going to win the war, and he was trying to get on the winning side, but having said all of that, it is all speculation. nobody really knows what was going on in arnold's mind. >> i do like you put him in the context of all the anguish and the decision making, so it is not an impetous move for him to switch sides. it could hav

. -- horatio gates, former british officer and was always suspected of conspiring really to replace washington as the commander and chief and was later defeated himself by lord corn wallace at the battle of camden, really destroyed the continental army in the south. >> right. >> and famously took off his horse and fled the battlefield. i always thought alexander hamilton very cruel when he estimated the pace at which he must have left. >> right. >> that was quite a pace for a man of his age. >> right. >> hamilton at the time of course was a very young man. [inaudible]. a lot of the blame of the failure of the saratoga campaign. >> yes, my assessment of the german troops is -- you know, i think they did a solid job. i think the german commander was a solid commander. i think, you know, burgoyne's -- i think a lot of that is the blame game piece. you see burgoyne almost immediately -- in fact, even before his surrender, he's blaming -- or he places a lot of the blame on the german troops. and i think he's just grasping at straws at that point. and of course that is found out about month laters a