the iaea, why the iaea is involved, because we have nuclear medicine. nuclear techniques are very useful to screen and diagnose the cancer. it is also very useful to afford the therapy. i do not mean that we can do all. for example, be patient. it is not the iaea's role, and i do not have the expertise how we had better to get rid of smoking. it is who's work, and health care system is not our expertise. and we know our limit. so we have made an agreement between who and iaea, and we are working together. we have expertise in particular field, but we know our limit. and we recognize the need to cooperate with the other entities in case of cancer, it is who. nowadays the private companies have the expertise and financial means. they help us to finance on the cancer program. this coordination is not only in cancer program. just, for example, we have some very important program for the plant mutation, food security, food safety. and we have the joint unit established by fao and iaea. and this joint unit is local motive -- locomotive to promote additives in

he iaea estimate -- iaea estimate is not -- we ask countries. usually we put questions during this period, from april through july, and gather the information and combine them, and that is the estimate. the difference is that more emphasis is placed on nuclear safety. the pace of growth has slowed down or slower than what we anticipated or estimated before fukushima. but with slower pace and with higher emphasis on safety, nuclear power will expand. >> thank you very much, director general. i have more questions, but maybe i should give a turn to somebody else. why don't -- go to the microphones, there are microphones on either side and i think that will be easier than me trying to catch -- you trying to catch my eye, and maybe we'll take a couple questions at a time. and when you start, please identify yourself in the usual way and your affiliation. try to keep your questions short and without extended commentary. so we'll start over here, please. >> hi. warren stern, brookhaven national lab, former employee of yours, director general. so the s

quality regulatory bodies in different countries that give advice, support to the iaea and the iaea does an excellent job itself. >> should be renamed pm to 10? [inaudible] >> to have a view. ray lahood is for industry. >> they are a member of wano. i stand corrected. thank you all. i'm told we are going to transition to her speaker, our next session. thank you very much. [applause] >> they had a very political merits, not lake john and abigail. so she would thought the in the halls of congress. she was always very careful to say my husband believes the and advocates that, but she herself was doing the pitch and one of her husband's opponent says he hope if genes are ever elected president, she would take up housekeeping like a normal woman. and she said of james and i are ever elected, i will neither keep house or make better. >> transportation secretary, ray lahood spoke at the import expert banks in washington d.c. he tacked to the sequester spending cuts in their effect on air travel. secretary lahood said expanding high rates fail in the u.s. >> i will be brief and an introduct

. >> the iaea experts have ended an eight-day review of the efforts to decommission the damaged plantthey visited the site and interviewed officials from the government and tokyo electric. the experts urged company executives to do a better job managing the buildup of radioactive water at the facility. they also want tepco to explain the impact the water is having on the environment around the plant. iaea representatives say they will submit their final report on the decommissioning plans within one month. >>> millions of people around the world remember the worst time of kim's life. the pulitzer prize winning picture of her running in pain following napalm bombing in vietnam is considered an image that conveys the atrocity of war. she continues to tell her story to push for peace. nhk world went to hear her speak in tokyo. >> reporter: kim has spent years talking about a moment of her life that is one of the enduring memories of the vietnam war. >> that day changed my life forever. >> reporter: it was june 8th, 1972. kim phuc was 9 years old, naked, and running down a road in souther

we apply iaea safeguards at our licensed facilities, we maintain a roe bust security program -- robust security program at all the facility, and we are responsible for licensing the import and export of nuclear materials and technology for civilian use. we are also actively engaged internationally with our regulatory counterparts, providing bilateral and multilateral assistance to emerging countries. in fact, after i'm finished here today, i'm flying to a conference in ottawa to meet with my international regulatory counterparts. the nrc's international engagement plays a significant role in informing our work. there's a lot to learn from what others are already doing. this has been proven to us time and again, particularly in the area of operating experience. conferences like this are also important for the same reason, and i just want to note that there are quite a few folks from the nrc attending this conference. and i see a table full of them over here. [laughter] regulatory bodies provide an essential perspective in the global non-proliferation discourse. it's the absence of regul

one is to use a facility under iaea inspection. that's the breakout scenario where they would either deny the inspectors access or they would kick out the inspectors and as quickly as possible they would produce enough highly enriched uranium for nuclear device. right now there are -- they are probably at least a couple months away from being able to do that. as they increase capacity, as they put in more centrifuges, more efficient and more parcel centrifuges, like this new generation, they might be able to squeeze down that break out time to a couple weeks or even less. it would be, theoretically possible that they could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb before the international community could act. i think there are still -- they are still probably a couple years away from having that capacity, because they would need to put in a lot more these more advanced centrifuges in order to do that. that theyscenario is would build a secret facility and then produce weapons-grade uranium, taking their time, and then once

security council resolutions, fully cooperate with iaea inspectors at all their nuclear sites.if a deal cannot be reached, iran should expect more sanctions and covert action. military forces as a last resort but it remains an action to deter iran from building nuclear weapons. indeed, the task force included and ago, the obama administration must assure this threat remains credible as it may be the only course that deters iran from deciding to build nuclear weapons, end quote. even as we track to solve a neww clear question dashing the question we must do again to alleviate on ordinary evans. we recommend that designate one or two u.s. third country or iranian banks that could conduct transactions solely on trade and food and medicine, and to facilitate other humanitarian goals. in october of last year, the treasury department such trade but there's no financing mechanism to prevent it from occur. if not only build in the long-term good will of the rainy people, but it would make it harder for the iranian government to blame the united states for the pain their own inability t

by then, former iaea inspector david albright estimated the country already possessed as much as 50 kilograms of plutonium. however, the north koreans might have used up some of their supply. they carried out three nuclear experiments since 2006, the latest in february. analysts believe scientists used plutonium in the first two tests but they are not sure about the third. the people's assembly unanimously adopted legislation on monday to reinforce the nation's status as a nuclear power. that essentially means they show the intention to produce more plutonium to further develop their nuclear program. officials in the u.s. and south korea have long been pushing for denuclearization on the korean peninsula, but it is getting almost impossible to convince north korea's leaders to abandon their nuclear program. >>> south korea's president is standing firm in the face of the growing threats from her neighbor. park geun-hye ordered her ministers and intelligence chief to be prepared to deter or respond to any provocation. park held her first security minister's meeting since she took power in febru

what became of those barrels, so we headed straight to the experts of the ocean laboratories of the iaea. scientists are exploring how radioactivity accumulates in fish. they told us the english channel barrels would have resolved a long time ago. >> we are constantly examining the sea floor. we would have found some of the drums if there were any there. >> but then, we find this. a rusty drum. its radioactive contents have been dispersed into the sea amid this untouched barrel of nuclear waste. proof that there are still in tact containers of nuclear waste at the bottom of the english channel. we pay a visit to the channel island with a british scientist. his gamma ray spectrometer reveals increased levels of radiation. >> 198. 184. >> there was a lot of uranium. they dumped enormous amounts of enriched uranium. >> our geiger counter confirms the radiation is twice as high as normal. this nuclear waste is in a fishing zone, and the barrels continue to rust in silence. >> remember, you can find out more about these and many more stories at our website, dw.de. >> thanks very much for join

. >> rose: is that what you think the iaea believes? >> the iaea has not said anything to the contrary. i may be wrong. the hard evidence is on the table, surely the world will rally around to say iran should not build a nuclear weapon. india's position is we cannot afford another country in that region to builnuclr weapon. this will have an effect on other countries. other countries will want to have nuclear weapons. the whole area will get nuclearized and that is bad for world peace. we have clearly told iran that we do not support iran's efforts, if any, to build a nuclear weapon. maybe they are trying. but at the moment, there is no evidence to say that they are building a nuclear weapon. >> rose: i know you have future appointments but i have two last questions. number one, do you believe that india should be a signatore to the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty. >> not the present one which we believe is discriminatory, and we have given reasons for that. gnd ory an belie because the existing treaty is discriminal that another-- disc

security council resolutions, fully cooperate with iaea inspect various and nuclear site. if a deal cannot be reached or arranged expect more sanctions and covert action. it remains an option to deter iran from building nuclear weapons. indeed, the task force concluded, and i quote, the obama had in frustration must assure the threat remains credible as it may be the only course that deters a rant from to build nuclear weapons. even as we try to solve the nuclear question, we must do what they can to alleviate the impact on iranians. we remain opec and treasury designate one third country iranian banks that could combat transactions solely on trade and food medicine and facilitate other humanitarian goals. in october last year, treasury to permit such a trade, but there's no financing mechanism to occur. this would not only build in the long-term goodwill of the ukrainian people, but make it hard for the reigning government to blame the united states for the pain of their own inability along with sanctions for cosby such steps would make it easier for allies to continue to

from iran's stand point, this council and iaea acts are not considered legitimate. from iran's stand point, they are not requiredded to comply with any of the resolutions. they should be treated like any other party in terms of enjoying and extensive nuclear program under iaea safeguards so from the legal perspective the two sides approach this negotiation for very different standpoint. given these fundamental differences, interests, and perspective, the theory of the p5 plus one has been to have a theory to have modest measures to eliminate iran's nuclear program in some way in exchange for limiting sanctions, and in the hope that that would create confidence and create a context that would make it possible to try to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement. at the same time, slow down the nuclear program, but even in this modest area, the two sides are very far apart in terms of the quid pro quo. both sides accept -- they say "concept" that we're talking about, limits on the nuclear program in exchange for limits on sanctions, but when you get down to the details,

one is to use a facility that under iaea inspection. that is where they would deny that inspectors aspect -- access or kick them out or as quickly as possible produce enough of a highly-enriched uranium for nuclear device. right now there are probably a couple of months from being able to do that. as they increase capacity and put in more centrifuges and increased capacity like the new generation, they may be able to squeeze the break up time to a couple of weeks or even less. leastt case it does at theoretically possible they could produce enough highly- theched uranium before international community could act. i think they're still a couple of years away from having that kind of capacity, because they need more of these advanced centrifuges in order to do that. the other scenario that i think is much more plausible is what we call sneak out. once they have enough, they would be in a position to confront the world. we know that second approached is one that iran favors. my guess is at some point in the future they will try to build ano

the iaea is saying that tepco need to continue efforts to improve the reliability of essential systems to assess the structural integrity of site facilities and to enhance protection against external hazards. that's according to a statement put out by the international atomic energy agency, according to afp. basically they're calling on tepco to improve efforts to stabilize that. >> people in the area do not have confidence in the authorities or in the utility. and this latest nauz certainly is not going to help. >> certainly isn't. >>> now, if you're traveling by lufthansa today, i have one word for you, a couple of words. be sure to check your flight. a major strike could impact travel in and around europe. the german airline is canceling 1,700 flights after a walk-out. thousands want a pay increase of more than 5%. lufthansa has rejected that demand. the union staged a similar strike last month. >>> at we reach the one-weak mark we'll bring you more on the situation in the boston area. >> we'll tell you about a busy zard sporting incident that took place on the field sunday. call it

didn't make any difference because they didn't show the iaea anything critically important anyway.presence or absence of inspectors would make much of a difference in north korea. back in my confirmation days i got into trouble for something i said ten years ago, there is no such thing as the united nations, by which i meant the u.n. has no separate existence in a situation like this. it's only what its member governments are prepare to have it do, and given hour divided the security council is, withrich and china flying political cover nor north korea, the security council will not be able to act effectively before this plays out. >> neil: i know you're the foreign policy expert but i nowhere countries are on a map so i'm equally qualified to talk about this. i think that china doesn't know what the hell to do with this guy and he is a nut out of control. >> well, look, number one, we don't really know who is in charge in north korea, and i'm just amazed when watch the director of national intelligence testify as he has in the past couple of days that this is somehow a reflection

it's not like north korea where they told the iaea to take a hike and threatening war.a little more nuance but ultimately iran is revolutionary regime and wants to increase its power and doing it politically throughout the region. and taking a page from the book of north korea and with north korea, i think we're going to wake up one day and iran will have a nuclear weapons capability or all of the segments that can be connected easily. >> gregg: if the mullah's see weakness with respect to obama's administration, that gives an added incentive to accelerate their nuclear program? >> one of other problems about a tit-for-tat rather than overwhelming retaliation, another problem is the distance what we have been putting between our allies and us. john kerry wasn't just talking to china. he was over in south korea probably schooling them. we have been preaching them not to overreact to a north korean attack, possibly not to react and sending the same message to japan. and in the middle of this crisis, we chose friday to lecture japan about its currency devaluation which is

bush, after that north korea pulled out of the nonproliferation treaty and then kicked out the iaea, u.n. atomic agencies from pyongyang and they went ahead and did several tests. that's where we are now. there are americans who continue to go to north korea. not all the time, but they do still go. some of them are very highly based scientists, one was the director of the los alamos laboratory, and many others, former secretaries of defense, william perry, and others have been there. and they do have this two-track, or track 2 policy going on. there are people who can have this dialogue. but they're not empowered to have official dialogue. >> they're very sensitive, the north koreans. when i was there in december 2010, christiane speaks about the visit which was well received in pyongyang of the new york philharmonic. the north koreans wanted to send their philharmonic to perform in new york at carnegie. they were told that that was going to happen, reciprocal visit. i don't think that has happened. they're very sensitive, relatively small things like that. the. >> they are. you know

and if that could be internationally verified with the iaea, i think the president has enough flexibility that exists in the law to make that offer. but clearly that's the key issue the iranians want to know how much we are willing and able to put on the table, and in return for what. it would have to be very carefully calibrated. >> could i just add, the framework worked reasonably well until the bush administration came in. the iranians did not build bombs during that time. they did not turn out more plutonium. and neither side really kept its part of the bargain but the u.s. was supposed to build civilian nuclear reactors for north korea, and it never, it started but it was a very, very slow process, never was concluded. they were delays in heavy fuel oil shipments that were supposed to go to north korea. so it was an agreement that sort of worked for a time and then when george w. bush came in, he refused to let colin powell pick up where the clinton administration had left off. and the whole thing started to unravel. we discovered with north korea cheating and so on. these agreements

the united states and the iaea support evidence by south korea and others, demanded that north korea subject itself to special inspections by the international atomic energy agency, so that the agency and the rest of the world could know precisely how much plutonium north korea had. north korea refused to allow those inspections. the u.s. had another concern. the five megawatt reactor that they had in operation had spent fuel in it that they wanted to discharge. that spent fuel, when discharged and cooled in cooling ponds, would be able to be plutonium would be able to be separated from it, and from that. five to six nuclear weapons worth of plutonium could have been produced. the united states in those early months of 1994 took the tissue the united states nations security council, seeking economic sanctions. at the same time, it augments its military forces in and around the korean peninsula. north korea, stated both publicly and privately, it would regard the declaration of sanctions by the security union as a declaration of war and react accordingly, and then in may, 1994, north

is we wanted to start off the conference after the great session that the director general of the iaea, by focusing on perspectives from the three states that arguably will determine in a sense the pace of the implementation of many items on the agenda here in the nuclear order. russia, china and the united states for obvious reasons, and perhaps not so obvious reasons. really will create the necessary conditions for the progress, if not the sufficient conditions, on nuclear disarmament, on nonproliferation, including in the role in the u.n. security council, but also the role in the nuclear suppliers group, the nuclear fuel cycle in many ways, and nuclear industry where russia and china are perhaps the countries with the two most ambitious plans for further development with nuclear energy. so these three countries are absolutely indispensable and their cooperation is going to be necessary for progress, and so that's why we want to have such insightful speakers as rose gottemoeller, alexei arbatov and general yao yunzhu here to address you. now, i should say from the very beginning tha

director clapper, iran has been in continues to enrh uranium to stockpile the uranium currently under iaea safe guards. my concern; however, iran might be able to stockpile enough uranium to enrich weapons and produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short period. your prepared statement include an important assessment that iran could not divert safe guarded material and produce a weapons of mass destruction before this activity is discovered. can you tell us about how much warning you believe we would have? clearly -- we adopt hold the most likely -- our assessment is that if they were to move to highly enriched uranium which would be a dead giveway will there's no other reason to be produced other than a weapon. the most likely scenario they could it covertly. it would lengthen the time to which they could develop a testable single weapon. brsigtiesf they were to do a t, which is as you indicated under safe guard and ae ia a super vision. that's a bellwether. that would be a warning. if they dorp to do, which we think is east likely scenario, it would be a fairly brief time as we indicate

bush, after that north korea pulled out of the nonproliferation treaty and then kicked out the iaea,atomic agencies from pyongyang and they went ahead and did several tests. that's where we are now. there are americans who continue to go to north korea. not all the time, but they do still go. some of them are very highly based scientists, one was the director of the los alamos laboratory, and many others, former secretaries of defense, william perry, and others have been there. and they do have this two-track, or track 2 policy going on. there are people who can have this dialogue. but they're not empowered to have official dialogue. >> they're very sensitive, the north koreans. when i was there in december 2010, christiane speaks about the visit which was well received in pyongyang of the new york philharmonic. the north koreans wanted to send their philharmonic to perform in new york at carnegie. they were told that that was going to happen, reciprocal visit. i don't think that has happened. they're very sensitive, relatively small things like that. the. >> they are. you know, i'm

currently under iaea safeguards.the concern however is that iran might be able to stockpile enough uranium to enrich weapons-grade uranium and to produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short period. your prepared statement includes an important assessment that iran could not divert safeguarded materials and produce a weapons worth of uranium before the tivoli is discovered. can you tell us about how much warning you believe we would have quick. >> clearly we continue to hold the most likelyssessment, our assessment is that if they were anm which d a dead giveaway it wouldn't be produced other than for a weapon most likely scenario is the would do that covertly. to actually slow the time or lengthen the time to which they could develop a testable single weapon. clearly, if they were to do a breakout using the facilities they have now to enrich uranium which is as you indicated under safeguard and under iaea supervision that clearly is a real bellwether. that would be a big warning. if they were to do thatch i think i

security council resolutions and iaea resolutions that call on iran to do certain things including suspensionf some parts of their nuclear program and cooperate and so forth. from iran policy standpoint these security council's and are not considered legitimate. from iran's standpoint they are not required to comply with any of these resolutions. they should be treated like any of enjoyingin terms an extensive civil the clear program under the safeguards. from the legal perspective, the two sides are approaching this negotiation from a very different standpoint. given these fundamental differences and interests in perspective, the fairing of the p-5 plus one is to get an agreement on some modest measures that would limit iran pose a nuclear program in some ways and exchange for limiting sanctions treated in the hope that that would create confidence and create a context that would make it possible to try to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement. at the same time slowdown and a clear program. even in this modest area, the sides are very far apart in terms of the quid pro quo. both sides acc

for diverting attention than the real issue which is the noncompliance with its obligations to the iaea. we must continue to stress the conditionality of the enrichment rights. the vote in alienable -- though be "inable, these must conformity with articles 1 and 2 of the treaty." whether or not there in compliance is in question. this, itrd to separate is more important to quickly achieved a modest and useful agreement that can be easily monitored been seeking a more extensive and personal limitation. there appears to be an agreement to stop the expansion of the 20's term in retched iranian stockpile. it seemed this goal is more important than iran agreeing to move its stockpile to another country. it seems to me that ending the production of medium range iranian in iran is more important than shattering an underground facility. -- uranium in iran is more important than shattering an underground facility. it is the very persuasive to argue for closure on the negotiating table because israel is having trouble destroying that facility. sketchy,details are they're offering some relief to t