it's going to come from the nco. so overcoming that skepticism, overcoming that chasm of trust is difficult but it's happening. especially those dwlunts have deployed four and five times, young ncos and young officers are seeing the power of what a quad squad leader or platoon commander can doing to identify problems when they're still in the category of combat stress injuries. i think that's the strength of the marine corps's program. i think the problem with -- this is only my opinion now, of the army program is that it's vet well built. the application is not focused on the young nco as is the marine corps program. i don't say it because i'm a marine but i just sense that the nco identifying in iraq or afghanistan that there's a problem you can start the dialogue right there. and you can start the reconciliation process right there and you don't have 0 wait six months after he returns and he's got this problem and he pulls out when he's by himself. so we try to restore and very successfully restore because all of

so you've got your -- you've got your ocs-trained korean war veteran ncos. you've got six weeks of getting to know your troops including operation silver bayonne net, which was probably exactly what you needed in the sense that the troops feared they were out there but the amount of activity was low. and so then you're back in base camp, and you get word that there's another operation, and you're going to move to stage for that? >> yeah. let me say something about my assumption of command. the troops knew -- one of the things that i did before i -- we'd got to vietnam, when i joined the battalion, hal moore knew that i -- my background in special forces and all this, and i had been an avid reader of counterinsurgency operation books and so forth. i read a lot. i brought this foot locker full of books with me when i joined the battalion. so he had me give can classes at benning on counterambush drills and a lot of things which i'd learned in special forces and also through my reading. there was a good little book the british put out called "the small war's ma

do you think all senior ncos are thrilled with restrictions, escalation of force and roe and stuff luke that. no they're not. i have seen -- these are platoon sergeants who do what they're told to do. but are like, they don't like these rules. and what does the officer have to do? enforce them. all right. i mean, a lot of times, the marker of a good unit, especially the nco, modern unit is when they do stuff that they don't want to doable. they still do it. they will grumble a little bit. especially if it is a senior non-com, having private conversation with his company commander. what do they doened at the end the day? that's what's taught. especially in high quality organizations. but there is, you know, there is a conflict. you shouldn't. i don't want you to think, these things can get very messy on the ground. historically that's the case too. so here is a question. a lot of times historians phrase, i think the consensus was lee was pretty good also. although there is more of a debate. although perhaps that's just because lee lost. he is more open to criticicriti. grant is hard to c

i know none of my ncos were relaxed. they were always cautious about what we did because we didn't have the normal intel. we didn't have the kind of navigational goods. ie, good maps to basically point out what the terrain were. we were kind of stumbling in the dark. >> didn't you all have one map? >> yeah. >> alpha and then another rudimentary map? >> we did some -- yeah. and the reason was because, again, going back to how we got there in the first place, we were doing highway security on a pass just south of on kay and the mission was to provide outpost highway security. we got a call that you're going to be airlifted in to lz columbus for a operation. no maps. not even the kind of communications, the exchange of communications that you would normally get when you exchange units like that. >> right. >> so flying in, the chinook pilots, because again, we landed on an lz, nonsecure lz and ch-47s. >> we can go in to detail on that another time. >> that's a whole other story. >> yes, absolutely. so the two north vietnames

javionio calle a es us nco herman q comn la ganiza luegor de baja a su ex jefe y convertirse en capos la droga... en peru, grupos independientes del gobierno trabajan para determinar el impacto ecologico del proyecto minero conga, que se planea realizar en la region de cajamarca, en el norte del pais... un nuevo estudio ambiental establece que el proyecto requiere nuevas mejoras sustanciales por lo que el grupo de peritos espanoles estrego las recomendaciones y su informe al presidente del consejo de ministros... el ministro de medio ambiente declaro que el peritaje no determina la viabilidad del proyecto... en argentina, el senado comenzo a analizar el proyecto de ley de expropiacion de las acciones de yacimientos petroliferos fiscales --y-p-f-- en manos de la empresa espaÑola repsol, entre adhesiones a la medida y el rechazo de aquellos que alertan que afectara las inversiones extranjeras en argentina... la incertidumbre sobre el destino de la petrolera, llevo a la agencia moodys a reducir su calificacion de b-3 a b-a-3 ambas en la categoria de bonos basura... haos eimentado dias an

so we had a lot of respect for all our officers and ncos. >> okay. well, on sunday morning november 14th you all air assault down into x-ray. did you have any idea on your level kind of what you were getting into or what your -- i know you knew what your assignments were going to be once you hit the ground. but what did you know intelligencewise on your level as a machine gunner, system machine gunner? >> we knew absolutely nothing of what we were stepping into. we were just out on another mission, another search and destroy mission that buy. got off in the jungle, dropped off in another part of the jungle. we were doing that every day, looking for an enmai emynemy. and that day was no different from the rest. but it turned out we stepped into a hornet's nest. >> so when you all -- tell me what happened when you went to your positions and how soon things started off now. >> well, we had landed. we got off on the huey helicopters. three-man machine gun crew. russell adams was the gunner that day. i was the assistant gunner. and then we had an ammo bea

three rifle platoons, most of whom -- well, most of whom except for your career korean and experienced ncos and yourself have never been in combat, never had a shot fired in anger against them. you hit this lz, and you start taking fire shortly thereafter. how difficult was it for you to pull those platoons into their -- in their positions? >> not difficult. they landed. i met the lieutenants and said, okay, you link up with so-and-so, and 3rd platoon is right over there. this is a small landing zone. so we were going from where the helicopters landed to the creek bed wasn't more than 150 yards at most. 100 yards. and i started them in the right direction and wait for the next one to come in. >> tell me about the first -- your observations of the first reactions of your troops to enemy fire? zoo i hit the ground and started firing wildly in the direction of the enemy. let me give you a sequence of events of what happened. it the first plap toon goes over to the left, and the second platoon lands and it goes between the first platoon and company. the third platoon lands and it go -- becomes

having talked to a lot of young officers and ncos back from both w wars, i'm curious, you know, address for a moment the young marine leaders that have served with you, you know, they've been, you know, doing all this coin but were drawing down, the national strategy says, you know, no more prolonged coin. shift, pivot to asia, partnership building. the corps itself is trying to get back to its maritime and extraditiex pra di extraditi extraditionary routes. and we're drawing down. to a young marine, lieutenant, captain, sergeant today what do you say about -- why is there experience of the last decade relevant? how are they going to have to adapt? why thshould they stay in when everything's changing radically? >> that's good. i've had discussions recently with a lot of our young leaders and marines. and i will say coin is a complexion type of fighter. some people tend to think it's all about okay clear, hold, build. and then the job is done. what we're doing right now -- and this year is critical to the transition -- is we're not necessarily changing the mission in afghanistan. but we'

he is responsible for the culture, making sure his nco's. the military takes that ethic on very seriously. okay. but again, that is a professional imperative. is that the best historical explanation for things like whether or not a whole country or army wins in the war or not. maybe not. maybe not. can you still -- you see how those are different. that being said, most military historians take the view that generals do water so they'll talk about things like you know, loss of nerve. sometimes they will be ingred ble critical. the military historian's version of monday morning quarterbacking. it's almost similar to reddick, but is that fair. things like that. so, i want to throw this back. i want to come back to grant. grant. what do you think? good general? bad? i didn't give you the case against him. i need the center. any one who wants to try to push back on that. or construct an argument. maybe even if you don't believe. >> his eye strategy was keep throwing more boats at it. we have more men. there were like 7,000 people in two hours. >>

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>> i asked my immediate supervisor, my nco. and he was like, "johnson, i don't know. we got the orders, we're going to iraq." >> hinojosa: so you can act... in that sense, you can say to your commanding officer, "why," and that's okay? >> well, not my commanding officer. it was my... you know, it was a little bit ways down. and... >> hinojosa: saying that to a commanding officer, maybe not so much. >> yeah. and for captain king, i did ask. and, you know, of course, not the same way. i would be like, "you know, sir, what is the mission for us to be going into iraq?" "we're supporting, you know, patriot missiles," and this and that. and i was like, "okay, but aren't the mechanics going with them? why are we, the cooks, the supply clerks, going into..." "that's the orders we were given, this is the mission, this is what we have to do." and that's the answer. and that's not even a really good answer, but... >> hinojosa: you guys head off in a convoy. >> yes. >> hinojosa: of how many trucks? >> initially we were in a large convoy of, like, 600 vehicles long. >> hinojosa: o

it's going to come from the nco. so overcoming that skepticism from overcoming that chasm of trust is difficult but it's happening. especially the units that have deployed four or five times coming down the nco officers are seeing the power of with a squad leader or platoon commander can do to identify problems when they are still in the category of the stress injuries and have a migrated combat stress illness. i think that is the strength of the marine corps program. a think the problem with my opinion now of the army program is very well built. the application isn't focused on the young nco as the programs. the in co identifying an iraq or afghanistan but there's a problem you to stop the dialogue right there and it's on the record of the process you don't have to wait six months after he turns and he's got this problem he pulls out then when he is by himself, said he tries to restore very successfully restored because of these veterans have come in and fall into the services. this past week we get 35 marines. we h

now those programs the trust is going to come from the nco. overcoming the skepticism is difficult, but it is happening. especially units that have deployed 4 and 5 times, younger officers are seeing the power of water platoon leader can do to identify problems when they are still in the category of combat stress injuries and not migrated to illness. that is the strength of the marine corps's program. you can start the dialogue right wait six don't have to months after he returns and he has a problem when these by himself. we tried to restore -- and successfully, because all of these veterans have volunteered their services. we got 35 marines in the past week. we had an individual travel all the way from oregon six times. his brother was killed and he is giving up a week of his time. we had someone from wyoming. these people are giving of themselves for me, so the chasm of trust is taking care of pretty quickly. by wednesday of a seven-day program these people start realizing these people care for me. then you are on the road to identification

we have to make sure we get all our and co -- nco's up, our junior enlisted. >> i am a proud 10-year army wife. i am pretty tired after 10 years of war. i really appreciate your last statement, keeping faith with the families. one of the, i think, challenges we are facing as we develop a lot of great programs around resiliency is getting real time information from the ground, particularly as we are dealing with reintegration. the mental health advisory teams that we have deployed in theater -- i wonder if it is feasible to use something like that while we are going through reintegration. what we are seeing with the families as the guys come back, particularly these buses and the children -- if we were able to have a mechanism to get that grass-roots real-time information up to inform policy, which those mental health advisory teams have done so well, that could be something we could really leverage to affect the policies we have so little money for now. >> i think that is a great idea. what many of you in this room, particularly in the medical profession, will now is we have been on

having talked to young officers and nco's back from both wars, address young marine leaders that have served with you. they have been doing all of this coin. a national strategy says no longer a that, did it to asia, partnership building, the court is trying to get back to its maritime and expeditionary roots. everything is drawing down, including the number of personnel. marine lieutenant or captain, why is their experience in the last decade role of the relevant? why should they stay in which everything is changing radically? >> that is good. i have had those discussions recently with aryan leaders and marines. i will say coin is a complex type fighter. think it is very clear, cold, build. then the job is done. what we're doing this year is critical to the transition. we're not changing the mission in afghanistan. walkinganging -- we're into the final stage of the counterinsurgency, to revise and train. it is to set the indigenous forces up for success. the mission is not changing. we have trained our guys to understand in the counterinsurgency, you cannot win the counterinsurgency

they want transactions being anonymous and then you have this nco yuan hyperdrive. everyone has submitted to the idea that let tronic money in our lives is useful. we have a bank account of maybe the credit card, not alike tronie money in general but most of us have given us to this idea and if you say let's use cash from everyone says well, big brother might be watching down the banks in the credit card companies are going to be monitoring all of my transactions. you are deliberateness worlds they get this kind of recoil response. another group you have, less of them, sort of impassioned, but i hear from a lot of people, i don't know, there's just something about the physical. there's just something about the physical. a lot of people who don't love e-books frankly. they love to hold something and you know i think embedded in that response is also a much more sincere concern that people seem to hang onto cash more tightly and we can talk about this a little bit more but the credit card effect catalyzes spending and that is a huge problem for a lot of people. americ

they want transactions being anonymous and then you have this nco yuan hyperdrive. everyone has submitted to the idea that let tronic money in our lives is useful. we have a bank account of maybe the credit card, not alike tronie money in general but most of us have given us to this idea and if you say let's use cash from everyone says well, big brother might be watching down the banks in the credit card companies are going to be monitoring all of my transactions. you are deliberateness worlds they get this kind of recoil response. another group you have, less of them, sort of impassioned, but i hear from a lot of people, i don't know, there's just something about the physical. there's just something about the physical. a lot of people who don't love e-books frankly. they love to hold something and you know i think embedded in that response is also a much more sincere concern that people seem to hang onto cash more tightly and we can talk about this a little bit more but the credit card effect catalyzes spending and that is a huge problem for a lot of people. americ

they want transactions being anonymous and then you have this nco yuan hyperdrive. everyone has submitted to the idea that let tronic money in our lives is useful. we have a bank account of maybe the credit card, not alike tronie money in general but most of us have given us to this idea and if you say let's use cash from everyone says well, big brother might be watching down the banks in the credit card companies are going to be monitoring all of my transactions. you are deliberateness worlds they get this kind of recoil response. another group you have, less of them, sort of impassioned, but i hear from a lot of people, i don't know, there's just something about the physical. there's just something about the physical. a lot of people who don't love e-books frankly. they love to hold something and you know i think embedded in that response is also a much more sincere concern that people seem to hang onto cash more tightly and we can talk about this a little bit more but the credit card effect catalyzes spending and that is a huge problem for a lot of people. americ