we don't feel that the nrc, we should rely solely on the nrc to review its own previous failures.d we, therefore, believe that you need something akin to a kim any commission that you had following the tmi accident, similar to the blue ribbon commission you had following the bp oil spill. there are people in the industry, people in the government who do not want to have an independent review because they see that that might threaten their future course of actions. >> all right, thank you. let me ask, if i could, mr. boyd and mr. pardee to respond as well to this question. mr. boyd? >> thank you, senator. i know, and i just checked with my good senator here that the canyon has a real problem with regard to evacuation. you heard the small numbers of people, but there's incredibly limited access. so the number very we have is about 15 hours to evacuate the area because -- and that assumes the overpasses haven't collapsed on the freeway and that assumes one of the only two escape routes is available. so long as it's a little different with seven million people, i don't have the estima

that's why i'm hopeful the nrc will work with all stakeholders. if we get to this point, remain steady and remain unresolved. i thank you for the opportunity to testify today. >> congressman bill bray, welcome. >> it's an honor to be here. life-long resident of san jose county. i have the concerns that everyone has after seeing what happened in japan. every one of my children and grandchildren except to those who have been exiled to helen in montana not only live down wind. the state nocches but someone who the evacuation and response to not just the nuclear issue but also the tsunami issue. and also as a privilege of serving on the california coastal commission, an agency that has oversight and review of the nuclear power plants in california. this issue really did bring back memories of all the hearings and processes we've had the frankly there are still the facts to be taken, still research that needs to be done, but i think there are some indications that are very, very enlightening. one is the fact that even though the japanese plant was not

embassy in toke ya with nrc staff and other industries. doe and the nrc worked directly with the institute for nuclear power operations or npo and the nuke collar energy institute to encourage formation of an industry-led assistance team. they are now leading this industry team deployed both in japan and at npo head quarters in atlanta. the secretary adviser reached out to director and other scientists for technical advice. they are in touch with them on a daily basis as well as with an internal team of scientists and engineers to am amize the situation, suggest new approaches, and evaluate the potential solutions. beyond our response to the accident, the research development and deployment programs of my office are highly relevant to future decisions about potential options for nuclear power in the united states. our proposed small module reactor program explores designs and offer safety advantages of passive systems. we are conducting research and development at a high temperature gas reactor designs offering inherent design safety featu

the nrc will increase their inspections at these plants for the time being until they are corrected. >> tom, does this concern you, though? because they're now in this level three. when you hit level three, is it sort of a slippery slope? you quickly go to four? the risk of going to level four is higher? >> no. there are typically a few plants in that category three all the time that are -- have some need to improve, and the nrc is very tough on the plants in terms of keeping them tuned up and operating very well. of course, the industry and the owners of these plants are equally concerned about making sure they keep all of their processes and procedures functioning properly, all their operators performing to the standards. so it's not a crisis. if you got into a four or five category, that would be of significant concern. in fact, plants that get into a five category would probably be shut down by the nuclear regulatory commission. but this is -- i wouldn't say it's routine, but there are plants that are constantly trying to tune up their performance as measured by the nrc. >> and t

we don't feel that the nrc, we should rely solely on the nrc to review its own previous failures.and we, therefore, believe that you need something akin to a kim any commission that you had following the tmi accident, similar to the blue ribbon commission you had following the bp oil spill. there are people in the industry, people in the government who do not want to have an independent review because they see that that might threaten their future course of actions. >> all right, thank you. let me ask, if i could, mr. boyd and mr. pardee to respond as well to this question. mr. boyd? >> thank you, senator. i know, and i just checked with my good senator here that the canyon has a real problem with regard to evacuation. you heard the small numbers of people, but there's incredibly limited access. so the number very we have is about 15 hours to evacuate the area because -- and that assumes the overpasses haven't collapsed on the freeway and that assumes one of the only two escape routes is available. so long as it's a little different with seven million people, i don't have the esti

the nrc requires evacuation plants only withinen miles of a plant. but the american government has warned americans in japan to stay at least 50 miles away from the damaged reactor. we confirmed that when we turned our ships around about 50 or 60 miles. i guess when all else fails, we have to be absolutely certain that a way to evacuate these areas is foolproof in terms of its ability and its durability. and would it make sense to require evacuation plans in our country to address the same distance to u.s. facilities for new plan? >> well, that's something we're going to look at as part of the reviews we're doing. the ten-mile evacuation zones that we currently have are designed to be the region in which you pre-stage and prepare evacuations. if conditions were to warrant some additional reaction beyond that, those actions could aulsz be taken. as we've seen in japan, nuclear events tend to develop over a long period of time. this is three weeks into this event. and we've had the time and ability to make protective action recommendations and update t

when you take the wrapper off of this you see it has lots of warts on it, let me talk about the,nrcs, in the west. i know you all have your own. but i saw a persuasive speech by randy who is quite properly convincing. changes all the way from stainless steel pillows to ten gallons and black pillows of this. vegetationle changes, the lesson here, i think in general and this applies to,usgs, and national weather, we need to make sure the networks are in good enough shape to make these decisions. they don't cost a lot of money but you need to know the data out there is quite flawed and we need to take care of it and make sure in the future it's doing what it needs to for us. let me expand this. there's a very nasty fight going on on the future of some satellites right now. the fight involved climate centers on these centers and certain governments want to toss them in favor of weather sensors. weather is important but climate also is. it effects all of us. no data means no good research fundamentally. so i encourage you not to lose site of some of these bigger issues. >> very good. >> on

it is near the fault and the nrc calls it one of the most hazardous reactors in terms of earthquake damage. california has two nuclear power plants near the san andreas fault. diablo canyon near los angeles and also the reactor between san diego and los angeles. tavis: let me connect this conversation to your new book about the physics of the future. i have a chance to go through this and i was stunned and fascinated and scared at the same time. i was excited by some parts of the book about what you predict will be the kind of lives will be living in this country and the world by 2100. just a list i got my attention. you argue life expectancy at 150 years. cars that will drive themselves, courtesy of gps. how will physics define our future? >> take a look at the internet. by the next 10 years, computers should cost a penny. that is the cost of scrap paper. it will be basically free and inside our contact lens will leave blank. we will go on line. when we see someone that we do not recognize, it will identify who they are and print out their biography in your contact lens and translate if t

of course, a lot of counties are asking the nrc questions now after the nrc said in japan it should be people should be evacuating. the plans here just call for 10-mile radius. county officials all over the country are highly concerned about this. >> hopefully this is the wake-up call they need and i know it's complicated but has to be a way to fix the problems, to solve them. >> well, there are lots of details plans but involve the emergency planning zone that is are ten miles in radius. so that's really where the focus has been and this remains a question. we really need to learn a lot of lessons from what's going on right now in japan and it's going to take some time before we get all the information and see what the outcome is in japan, as well. >> many thanks. >>> the royal wedding, just weeks away. will the lego land version of the royal wedding be just as regal as the real thing? that's next. now the healing power of touch just got more powerful. introducing precise from the makers of tylenol. precise pain relieving heat patch activates sensory receptors. it helps block pain sig

. >> the nrc agrees with that because they require operating plans to have protection against a ground force attack. it would be a group of adversaries with certain weapons. they do not require protection against aircraft attacked for existing reactors. after 9/11, the issue came up whether that was appropriate and whether there were weapons that needed to be brought to bear, anti-aircraft weapons, etc. the nuclear regulatory commission was negative about that. they said that happens, we will have large areas of the plant that might be lost as a result of explosions and fires. the utilitiesed to develop plans as to how to deal with what could be the aftermath of an aircraft attacked somewhere on the site if they managed to hit the containment building. they did require those plans but then they said those plans don't have to meet the highest safety standards because that is a beyond design event, an airplane attacked, so we don't have to make them spend a lot of money on equipment for something that is beyond the design basis. i don't agree with that kind of decision. where the design

the nrc ran test where they used motte adversary teams to attack nuclear power plants to same if they could overcome the guard forces and disabled enough equipment to lead to a meltdown. before september 11, it was known that there was about a 50% failure rate. 50% of the time this ever terrorist could overcome the guard force and cause the equipment to fail and cause a meltdown. after september 11 and after millions of dollars in upgrades and increased guard sizes, the nrc is still running this test. they found that it is out -- it is now about a 10% failure rate. i personally do not think that is a significant enough improvement. we obviously need more work there. this was the famous case of a power plant where a member of the security team was supposed to be on duty at the time. peach bottom is a mark i. i will end it there and take your questions. [applause] >> thank you. now we would turn it over to dr. cochrane. -- we will turn it over to dr. cochrane. >> chernobyl was the worst nuclear accident in history. in the health physics profession, the way one measures the consequences,

the nrc sets standards, but if npo finds that a power company is not operating with the safety regime that it believes is important, it basically parades this in front of the entire industry. ceo s have been fired, and it has real teeth. i think if the analog is the operators of the drilling platforms, i think that there is some analogy that can be -- >> thank you. >> let me encourage all of panel members to take this opportunity to learn more about the commission's results as well as cherry's own insight. i would encourage questions from the panel. this may be one of our few opportunities to engage the commission so directly. paul? >> sure. not quite as familiar with npo and nrc, but in our industry, would you comment on the role that you see going forward with the api who has set standards for a number of years in our industry. you made a comment earlier about the need to set a safety commission separate from the lobbying effort which i presume is directed at api, but could you maybe compare and contrast the role that the api plays with our industry with your piece of the nuclear in

when drilling the well, but also in the attempt to stop the flow, and the national academy and the nrc study, are you expecting to reach any insights on those types of risks and perhaps another case that we might need to be concerned about as we look at regulations going forward? >> well, one of the areas we're looking at very specifically has to do with the unique aspects of this particular reservoir structure, the five different zones, the various pore pressures, the prakture grade yepts, and the challenges if you will dealing with attempting to cement and close out all five zones with the one single application. we're going to be looking at that in particular as a specific issue here and hopefully we can generalize that to try to provide a better perspective on how one may want to manage such risks in the future. >> as we close, just one comment, and i'll turn it back over to michael. these are terrific insights into something which occurred. this committee, of course, will be a forward-looking committee trying to gain information from what has happened here and put that into some f

nrc sets standards. if npo finds that a power company is not operating with the safety regime that it believes is important, it basically operates this confront of the entire industry -- it basically parades this in front of the entirendustry. if the analog is the operators of drilling platforms, there is some analogy that could be. >> thank you. >> that may eourage all the panel members to take this opportunity to learn more about the commission's results as low insight.'s own this may be one of our opportunities to engage the commission so directly. >> i am not quite as familiar asnpo, would you comment on the role you see going forward with the api which has set standards. he made a comment abo the need to set a safety commission separate from the lobbying effort, which is directed at api. could you compare and contrast the role that api has. >> the nuclear industry also has the nuclear industry industry association, which is an api- like body. it is a lobbying organization. it gets the industry toget

nobody really knows because what's hatched in japan appears to change all the thinking that the nrc,ce, as we've reported, ten miles is the emergency planning zone. but in japan they're saying 50 miles. so now county, state executives, all over the nation, don't really know. >> yeah. and, of course, with this there really is no room for error. i mean, this would require everyone to follow pretty strict orders. >> yes. but how can we guarantee that, right? if people hear there's been a nuclear accident and radiation is being emitted, lots of people certainly could panic. so do they all listen to the instructions? i don't know if we can count on that. >> all right, allan chernoff watching it for us. thank you, allan. very interesting report. >>> thousands of boston-area homeless women now get free health care, thanks to this week's cnn hero. we'll introduce you to her, next. >>> more than 2,000 women in boston are homeless, often living unpredictable and unstable lives. this week's cnn hero is giving them something they desperately need, free quality health care in the shelters. her na

and a member of the nrc committee on developing metrics for the department of homeland security science and technology research. noticeably absent from the witness table is the transportation security administration. tsa was invited to the initial hearing on march 13. it was postponed. they were invited to this hearing several weeks ago. and respond to these invitations, dhs has refused to send a tsa representative. on another committee hearing just yesterday, the department of homeland security refused to have a witness sit on a panel with other witnesses. dhs has staked out a claim that i think is intolerable. it is unconscionable that tsa will not send a representative here today to this important hearing on this program, that is slated to send $1.2 billion of the taxpayers money, to talk to us about it, and i find that totally reprehensible. in a letter to this committee, dhs sought to detail the subcommittee's interest presumably quoting from rule 10 of the house of representatives that delineates jurisdiction. in this letter they state, quote, given the subcommittee's interest in

nrc sets standards. if npo finds that a power company is not operating with the safety regime that it believes is important, it basically operates this confront of the entire industry -- it basically parades this in front of the entire industry. if the analog is the operators of drilling platforms, there is some analogy that could be. >> thank you. >> that may encourage all the panel members to take this opportunity to learn more about the commission's results as low insight.'s own this may be one of our opportunities to engage the commission so directly. >> i am not quite as familiar asnpo, would you comment on the role you see going forward with the api which has set standards. he made a comment about the need to set a safety commission separate from the lobbying effort, which is directed at api. could you compare and contrast the role that api has. >> the nuclear industry also has the nuclear industry industry association, which is an api- like body. it is a lobbying organization. it gets the industry

of the folks that work for him, and they talked about having close cooperation with general campbell nrc east on the border situation. they said it's gotten a lot better than six months ago. so that might be something too, you know? i'm an american reporter, maybe they were telling me what i want to hear, but i hadn't heard of any incidents on the border, so maybe one positive sign. on the positive signs in security, what happens if this summer the white house decides to go down 25% in forces by the end of the year? is there a chance of upsetting the progress by taking too many people out too fast? and another question, you all keep -- i keep hearing about the civilian surge, but the latest reports i'd heard in kabul were that something like two-thirds of the embassy employees who were supposed to work outside the embassy couldn't leave the embassy because of security concerns. while i was there almost nobody could leave isaf headquarters either. is it time to recognize that the folks you'd like to give this job to simply can't get to it, and it does have to remain the province of the mi

in the national academy and the nrc studies, are you expecting to reach any insights on those types of risks and perhaps another case that we might need to be concerned about as we look at regulations going forward? >> one of the areas we're looking at specifically has to do with the unique aspects of this particular reservoir structure. the five different zones, the various floor pressures, but try to radiance, and the challenges, if you will, associated with attempting to cement and close out all five zones with one single application. we're going to be looking at that, in particular, the specific issue here, and hopefully we can generalize that to provide a better perspective on how one may want to manage such risks in the future. >> as we close, just one comment and i will turn it back over to michael. these are terrific insights into something that occurred. this will be a four-looking committee tried to gain information on what has happened hanna. put that into a framework or we can make recommendations on what alternatives we have in the future. it is very important that we gain

cognitive sciences based methods and tools for intelligence and counterintelligence and a member of the nrc committee on developing metrics for the department of homeland security science and technology research. noticeably absent from the witness table is the transportation security administration. tsa was invited to the initial hearing on march 13 that was postponed. they were invited to this hearing several weeks ago. in response to these invitations, dhs has refused to send a tsa representative. on another committee hearing just yesterday, department of homeland security refused to have a witness said on a panel with other witnesses. dhs has staked out a claim that i think is intolerable. it is unconscionable that tsa will not send their representatives here today to this important hearing on this program. $1.2 billion of taxpayers money to talk to us about it and i find that totally reprehensible. dhs sought to detail is subcommittees interest presumably quoting from rule 10 of the house of representatives that delineates jurisdiction. in this letter they stay quote, given the subcommi

during the earthquake in haiti in nursing in the current response to events in japan, hhs, dod it, the nrc, the department of energy, are enhancing international cooperation on the ground through active disaster management assistance. we will study every aspect of the response in japan so we can learn lessons from the unprecedented earthquake, tsunami, and a nuclear emergency. beyond the ppd, we're seeking to be smarter in our approach by identifying a limiting steps and planning appropriately, reducing decision points before disaster strikes, reducing points of failure to planned simplification, developing documents to enable life-saving authority to optimize speed. focusing on the outlook -- the outcome of front and establishing well understood protocols for coordination and then practicing them to exercises. such as the upcoming nle 2011 which will simulate the catastrophic example of an earthquake in is on which includes eight states. while all disasters are unique, there are things that we can and are doing everyday to assist in better navigating would avert catastrophe may occur. new

even though we criticize you have to be thankful for our nrc. at least it does a better job.my question also, that confidential memorandum of understanding with who, i became ten years ago. i was pleased to see. also the attention of the major investigative reporter. in the context of fukushima. because i was complaining. he asked me have very interesting question, and i'm posing that question to you. asked by graduate students, and they could not find anything. besides one chapter in french on the internet and then your thoughts, here's the question he asked me. has there been any evidence that that memorandum has been used for cover-up of chernobyl can act any evidence to back thank you. >> well, as is and the chernobyl book which, by the way, was published originally had $150 by the new york academy, we now have available for $5 also on the internet in an e-book for $2.909. the information is at the back. yes, in the book that pointed out that the chernobyl which was released by the ia, e8, and who said there may be 4,000 people that died. there really weren't very many pr

that is why even when we criticize, we have to be thankful for the nrc. that confidential memorandum of understanding the and i e a -- the an iea, about 10 years ago -- and i was pleased to see it -- i brought to the attention of a major reporter the risks at fukushima. he asked me a very interesting question. i asked my graduate student to find it and he could not find anything. he started quoting one chapter in french on the internet. and he asked me, has there been any evidence that country's official memorandum has been used for any chernobyl cover-up? any evidence? >> as is in the chernobyl will, which by the way, was published at originally $150 by the new york academy -- we now have it available for $5 and also on the internet in and e-book for $2.99. but in the book, it was pointed out that the chernobyl forum, which was released by the iaea and the who, said there may be 4000 people who died. there were not many very -- very many problems and we need to move on and forget about chernobyl. in that document, they used about 300300 sites -- they use