and when we get to the same issues, sam sankar will take over. when we get to the negative test and the temperate abandonment issues, train eight will take over. so let's go. now, we'll first talk about the rig itself. we are also money with it, but everybody's on the same page so they know where it was and what was unique about it. we will then talk about what it's like to drill offshore wells, generally that and then the macondo timeline, then will come to the senate issues. some recent questions raised about cement, the temperate abandonment issues, kit detection, kicked means we is the term hydrocarbons that hydrocarbons are gas and oil. of course, you will see gas expand rapidly as it comes to the surface. if gas comes to the surface, it gets on the rig, that's bad. when gas gets in the well, and the rise, that's called a kick. as we go through these terms, a lot of us have never heard before, i will be sure to explain to them. and we will talk about the blowout itself. okay, here's the gulf of mexico, his houston, his temper, here's new orl

i think public sam sankar drove that -- i think sean grimsley drove that home. they treated the negative pressure test as a success. abandonment procedures introduced additional risks. sitting at 3,000 feet reduces the pressure at the bottom of the well. bp had good reasons for doing that. we feel -- i don't want to have anybody saying he missed something, tell us now. we think setting the temporary abandonment plug that low introduced some additional risk. people have told us looking at this that the simultaneous activities and the nature of the monitoring equipment made detection more difficult. if there is something i am less certain about, -- you can argue endlessly over the effects of moving mud around. that is a preliminary conclusion we are prepared to make. the big indications which i showed you were clear enough that if observed would have allowed the crew to respond earlier. the irony is we don't know what the driller was looking at. i would hope the information would be at least as good as halliburton. once the crew recognized the influx there were op

and when we get to the same issues, sam sankar will take over.when we get to the negative test and the temperate abandonment issues, train eight will take over. so let's go. now, we'll first talk about the rig itself. we are also money with it, but everybody's on the same page so they know where it was and what was unique about it. we will then talk about what it's like to drill offshore wells, generally that and then the macondo timeline, then will come to the senate issues. some recent questions raised about cement, the temperate abandonment issues, kit detection, kicked means we is the term hydrocarbons that hydrocarbons are gas and oil. of course, you will see gas expand rapidly as it comes to the surface. if gas comes to the surface, it gets on the rig, that's bad. when gas gets in the well, and the rise, that's called a kick. as we go through these terms, a lot of us have never heard before, i will be sure to explain to them. and we will talk about the blowout itself. okay, here's the gulf of mexico, his houston, his temper, here's new orle

and when we get to the same issues, sam sankar will take over. when we get to the negative test and the temperate abandonment issues, train eight will take over. so let's go. now, we'll first talk about the rig itself. we are also money with it, but everybody's on the same page so they know where it was and what was unique about it. we will then talk about what it's like to drill offshore wells, generally that and then the macondo timeline, then will come to the senate issues. some recent questions raised about cement, the temperate abandonment issues, kit detection, kicked means we is the term hydrocarbons that hydrocarbons are gas and oil. of course, you will see gas expand rapidly as it comes to the surface. if gas comes to the surface, it gets on the rig, that's bad. when gas gets in the well, and the rise, that's called a kick. as we go through these terms, a lot of us have never heard before, i will be sure to explain to them. and we will talk about the blowout itself. okay, here's the gulf of mexico, his houston, his temper, here's new orl

i think public sam sankar drove that -- i think sean grimsley drove that home. they treated the negative pressure test as a success. abandonment procedures introduced additional risks. sitting at 3,000 feet reduces the pressure at the bottom of the well. bp had good reasons for doing that. we feel -- i don't want to have anybody saying he missed something, tell us now. we think setting the temporary abandonment plug that low introduced some additional risk. people have told us looking at this that the simultaneous activities and the nature of the monitoring equipment made detection more difficult. if there is something i am less certain about, -- you can argue endlessly over the effects of moving mud around. that is a preliminary conclusion we are prepared to make. the big indications which i showed you were clear enough that if observed would have allowed the crew to respond earlier. the irony is we don't know what the driller was looking at. i would hope the information would be at least as good as halliburton. once the crew recognized the influx there were op

copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> i will now turn it over to our deputy counsel, sam sankar. >> i will ask you a few questions today. about the regulatory structure at the time of the macondo structure when i switch over to my feed. i want to talk about the new orleans office. is that your understanding that was the office that had jurisdiction over the macondo well? >> yes, that's correct. >> and -- hang on one second here. here's the organizational chart for the gulf of mexico region here. and the regional supervisor field operations -- it's a little hard to read michael and then the new orleans district office if i'm right is down here under the deputy regional supervisor for district operations. so about -- do you have any idea about how many rigs of any kind that that office is called to regulate and supervise? >> the district office -- >> yeah, the district office in new orleans. >> yeah, i don't know the exact number off the top of my head. i believe that there's a number of rigs prior to the macondo was on the order of 30, 35%. >> and about how many people work in th

. >> i will now turn it over to our deputy counsel, sam sankar. >> good afternoon, mr. crookshank. i'm going to ask you a qufez about the regulatory structure at the time of the macondo structure when i switch over to my feed. i want to talk about the new orleans office. is that your understanding that was the office that had jurisdiction over the macondo well? >> yes, that's correct. >> and -- hang on one second here. here's the organizational chart for the gulf of mexico region here. and the regional supervisor field operations -- it's a little hard to read michael and then the new orleans district office if i'm right is down here under the deputy regional supervisor for district operations. so about -- do you have any idea about how many rigs of any kind that that office is called to regulate and supervise? >> the district office -- >> yeah, the district office in new orleans. >> yeah, i don't know the exact number off the top of my head. i believe that there's a number of rigs prior to the macondo was on the order of 30, 35%. >> and about how many people work in that office? >>