these five getting astride sherman's planing, those six standing in sherman's front. so that will be 11 confederate brigades stretching from the eastern corinth road, eight on front, three in support, all the way to the owl creek bridge crossing which is now from us here roughly a mile to our west. so we've got a two-mile frontage. 2/3 of the confederate army. amazingly counting now the reserves that are coming into play, troops being sent from second division under will wallace to sherman's assistance, a brigade sent by hurlburt's division. they'll be put in position here immediately to our north, as well as regiments that grant will order out from pittsburgh landing, counting the total forces before the battle began, grant will bring half the union army to bear here on this frontage. starting with sherman, mclaren, all these reserve troops. i speak of them as reserves because they were camped in the rear. they come into play into the fight that will be post the over running of sherman's camps at 10:00, through the 11:00 time frame, through noon on up to 2:00, 3:00 i

and also, sherman. sherman -- when -- at the beginning of the battle in ray field, threw up his hand when heap dhe discovered confederate skirmishers less than 50 yards away, and a bunch of shots rang out, high volley from skirmishers, threw up his hand to ward off shots, the fact that the confederates were using buck-and-ball cartridges a round ball with free buckshot versus a rifle ball which would be typical of the rifle musket which was normally used. but anyway, a buckshot hitting in the hand and the rifle -- the musket ball killed his order leer thomas holliday sitting next to him. sherman was very lucky at that point that he was not killed. and there were several other incidents during the battle where his horse was killed or he could have been very seriously injured if not killed. and so, was this destiny? or was this just happenstance? these are some of the imponderable things just like assessing the generalship. how can we assess the generalship in terms of a, yes, after they were on the field

sherman's camps were on the other side. the interesting thing is when you stand here, i hope that visitors really key up on it. because you see three position tablets here at the double bridges here below the church. there was a double bridge in place. you have two branches of shiloh branch coming to a juncture on the west side of the road. sherman's camps were on the other side of shiloh branch of the for the most part, he did have one regiment in the south on the east branch over here to our immediate east in ray field. i hope the visitors understand when they stand here and they look at it, that they pick up on some salient point, and the point is you're dealing with three different organizations of the confederate army. three different brigades. you've got patrick clayburn's brigade from hardy's core. you have patten anderson's brigade of brag's core. and you have bushrod johnson's brigade of polk's corps. these are the center of the formations. we're dealing with 8:00 basically starting with clayburn, general time fram

they're assisting sherman but no one is assisting prentiss. he has one regiment that was ordered out to join him at pittsburgh landing, scheduled to join him anyway, to become part of the division, 15th michigan infant infantry, but they arrive without ammunition. they go into the line of battle armed with only the bayonet. no pewter and no musket balls in any cartridge to put in any of those guns. amazing. they stand a few minutes before the colonel, oliver, is getting them off the front to get out of here and go find some ammunition. that shows you also the nature of preparedness that these green armies find themselves. they're ordered to reinforce ammunition and he is unable to obtain any until it gets there. he can't find any here and has to back out. so just a striking example of the unpreparedness. but that's the only support that prentiss receives. so he's overwhelmed by four brigades against two, clear to see that it's mass meeting less sizeable force. both flanks are turned. command begins to break down. colonel peabody's killed. his

and that would be the divisions of sherman and benjamin prentiss. so part of the problem the con federals were running into is this engagement consumes about an hour. it would be an hour before hardee's troops are commanded to move forward after the squirmish begins. so powell and hardcastle are banging away at one another for nearly an hour before the main line under hardee's command steps forward. when it does, powell quickly realizes this is big-time. because he could just set there and count muskets, count flags and realize he's facing more than a mere reconnaissance. this appears to be a sizeable force much bigger than a brigade and he will begin to retire from this position. the confederates now, and you can just look at the landscape and just realize what they're going to have to encounter as they move forward. because you know how these men fight battles in the mid 19th century. they do it shoulder to shoulder in uniforme lines. linear formations. battle formations. they do that because the individual infantry solder lacks fire power. he's g

they go back to sherman's camps. they go back to stewart's camps, and general pope with a large proportion of his corps goes back to the april 5th, four miles after of pittsburgh landing. they completely uncover the front. that's when the federals begin to advance before dawn on day two and they're actually able to maneuver out and take advanced deployed positions far inland from pittsburgh landing. they don't have to fight for it. it is just left except for stragglers and call havery, and day two fighting in a short time is quickly turned on this union numerical advantage. they have to hastily redeploy from the zones and waking up to the fact it doesn't look like the federals are bugging out but reinforced and attacking back. beauregard will be alerted to the need to rally the army and so it will be better part of two hours of getting the troops out and maneuvered into positions in which they can engage this union force coming down upon them. things fall apart rapidly on the confederate left once grant is able to br

grant, sherman, albert sydney johnston, pete g.t. beauregard, brag and on and on we could talk. the wonderful that shiloh has above all the other battlefields in today's world and listening to the additions that are going to be made to shiloh makes this more a fact. it is location. location in a rural part of tennessee, a place which in so many ways remains very much akin to what this area looked like in that previous period. so we are very fortunate to have a july like shiloh here. what we are going to do today as van indicated. we are going to hear from three of the leaders in civil war scholarship as pointed out. i am not going to reintroduce them again. we have larry daniel at the en. we have wylie sore here at this end and in the middle, james lee mcdonough. the frightening thought is if a terrorist puts a bomb under this table and it goes off, we lose most of our historical knowledge in the battle of shiloh. if you see any suspicious packages, please inform your nearest agent. let me begin by asking our panelists, what we are going to do is have each person do an opening s

johnston, sherman is marching on johnson in 1864. sherman is trying to take atlanta and johnston essentially delays action, but even widely acknowledges that what in the end, even if you accept wigely, if we assume, yes, johnston did fight a masterful fabian campaign, what happens to atlanta at the end of the day? it falls. and why does wigely say it falls? it's not because of his lack of skill. >> west -- >> that's the larger strategic problem, right, and for that reason, by the time the effective strategy is chosen, johnston doesn't have, if you're trading space, if you're trading space for time, johnston doesn't have enough space to trade at that point. it's too late in the war to do that effectively. so what should have happened then? and this is called a counterfactual, right. all right, the more -- it's the what if. all right. and if it's tightly related to the issue of lee. because if you say lee's strategy is wrong, you must then give an alternative. and the alternative should give you a higher likelihood of success, all righ

also symbolic of "this horrid and unnatural war as william tecumsee sherman wrote. more than once as he spoke of the tragic clash when americans fought americans in the bloodiest of all american wars. i think it fitting that the colonel's word came during the first day of the first truly great battle of the war. that sunday, suggested biographer, lloyd lewis, just may have been relative to the number of troops engaged. and i emphasize that, relative off to the number of troops engaged. lewis said it just may have been the bloodiest single day of the war. grant considered shiloh, the severest battle ever fought in the western theater. and bloody shiloh, to borrow a bit of wily's book title was probably even more bloody than the casualty figures which for so long have been generally accepted. 23,746. i refer particularly to the number of lives that were lost in great clash. on average -- about 15% of the men wounded in civil wars died their wound. this factor would raise the number of deaths resulting for shiloh, making a total of almost 6,000 dead. furthermore -- gen

johnston, sherman is marching on johnston in 1864. sherman is trying to take atlanta. johnston fights a delaying action and even wiegly acknowledges that what in the end even if you accept wiegl's account and it is also dispute, but if we tomb johnson did fade a masterful fabian campaign, what still happens to atlanta at the end of the day. >> it falls. >> judge does he say it falls? not because of johnston's lack of skill. >> refusal to get troops to the west. >> that's the larger strategic problem, right. for that reason by the time the effective strategy is chosen, johnston doesn't have -- if you're trading space for time, johnston doesn't have enough space to trade at that point. it is too late in the war to do that effectively. what should have happened then? this is called a counter-factual, right? the more -- it is the what if. it is tightly related to the issue of lee. if you say lee's strategy is wrong, you must then give an alternati alternative, and the alternative should give you a higher likelihood of success. you need to give a plausible alternative. have

sherman and thomas j. wood from buell's command on april 8 primarily to see whether or not the confederates are regrouping for another hit. that's grant's biggest worry, that they may be regrouping for another strike. it's a bloodletting of proportions the nation was totally ill prepared to kind of factor. 23,746 men wounded, killed and missing. 3,500 men killed outright, basically, and 6,420 wounded and roughly the remainder, 3,600 or so, captured forces. they were constituted as missing, many of them wounded. so a massive bloodletting of a huge scale. the federal believed one more big strike and this war would have broke wide up in the west and everything would be resolved. sh shiloh disproved that completely. the confederate

and one of those is sherman. grant has limitations, some of his advances are failed because of in he want field commanders like me. the bench of effective field commanders is low, he has to respect. that's a good subtle argument of too much credit. >> you mentioned lincoln, lincoln was so triled to have a -- was aggressive. had more of annihilation. he wanted his general to attack lee's army, not necessarily take richmond. which it lined up better and lincoln needed somebody whether he won or not. >> maybe not so much grant as he disciplined kids. >> i think grant's failings are tactical. he's strategically very good but tactically less so. that is wilder ness. he gets his flanks turned. tactical skills. cold harbor. the atle of the angle. >> but that's not -- >> thinking of sharps berg. sharps berg. >> same thing. and cheetah mclellen. the angle. yes. you can certainly criticize the way -- we'll walk that ground. the way this all terminates are open to question. although in grant's defense, is it grant's job to

sherman. davis said yes thinking that nothing would come of it but that would buy time for davis to rally support against. but he never quits. never gives up this idea. but, what happens is that johnston asks breckinridge to accompany him for the negotiations at sherman and very quickly it turns into something altogether different. the open the negotiations not for the surrender of johnston's army but the surrender of all of the remaining confederate armies. who has the authority to do that? only davis but in the discussions with sherman, breckinridge says i will take the authority and the responsibility to myself. it is essentially a usurpation of presidential power. it's probably the biggest attempt to usurp power since alexander haig said i am in charge here. [laughter] but if breckinridge did it and was agreed and is presented as a fait accompli there may have been very little that davis could have done. so what do they get in their agreement with sherman? every single thing that breckinri

sherman first for his questions. >> i've advocated for well over a decade that you and your predecessors, for any terrorist listed organization that evidence is a desire not to be on the list as the ira wants evidence such a desire. and if they do meet those conditions, to remove them and the continued designation of the mek doesn't meet that standard in that they could meet and justify and the second concern i have is that maybe the process has been influenced by poorly conceived notion that will be nice to tehran and tehran will be nice to us and therefore we will list the enemies that they seem to hate the most and then finally the camp ashraf and to depresent violent attacks on them. and we see individuals at that camp unable to get refugee status in europe in part because of that designation. when reviewing potential fto targets, the state department and whether it retains the capacity and intent to carry out such attack and there are times when we should add to the terrorists more quickly. we did not designate al qaeda the arain bee general peninsula the days before the attempted b

to discussing these and other issues with ambassador benjamin and i'll now turn to ranking member sherman for an opening statement. >> thank you chairman royce for holding this hearing. july 4th, 2012, the new bureau was announced. the administration has requested $228 million to fund various anti-terrorism with the bureau. in fiscal year $286 million and fiscal year 2012 will be 238 and they are seeking a significant decrease in funds available for anti-terrorism programs. i'd like to thank ambassador benjamin for his service. and i look forward to his continuing service in this continuing difficult global environment. i am less skeptical of the chairman of the bureau of counterterrorism being in fact a bureau and not an office and even if the administration was seeking an increase in funding for the bureau, i -- given the importance of your work would be supportive but it appears from the statistics i just went over that the administration is able to function without seeking an increase. one program of particular importance is the encountering violent extremism for at-risk youths for pr

sherman. but obviously grant is a part of this set of schemes. all right. so here you have some of the different methods of aniling confederate military power that grant embarks on. which widely sees as, if nothing else, successful. and that's the argument. at the strategic level, that's where grant comes in. and not only that, he has the personal traits. generals still matter. you can be like mcclellan and have a plausible strategy. but if you can't execute it, at least in his case, he loses his nerve, then the game is up for that strategy. it's not going to be operationally effective. let me step back. grant is on the winning side of the war. but someone give me an argument as to, okay, so what? why does that not necessarily mean he's a good general? all right. mr. roth. elaborate on that. >> there's a line in the book that said we had more people at the peak of the union military than the confederates had in the general. >> it's a lot more inindustrialized than the south was. >> and so much credit do we give generals for having bigger resources, right? h

mcdowell's brigade camp, headquarters, which was part of sherman's division, right flank of the sherman division as it lay in camp around shiloh church. there's another union camp that they occupied at neat for the north, one of the brigades of mcclernan's division, it's a probably as well. but i think the highest probability is the 16th camp, mcdowell's camp, they were there for some time and i can see them taking this flag. and this was donated to the park years ago. from descendents of major gober. it's in good shape, showing that it was well cared for and stored. even though apparently this has been buried at one time in ground. that's the story. that's the family story. with a loved one for a while in a grave. i'm not sure. but it was recovered later. and that's how they claim that staining occurred. it may have gotten wet underground. at that point in time. all the flags underwent major conservation treatment so they could be properly exhibited. the next flag is not a relic of the battle, or been a witness flag of the battle. this is an 1864 dalton pattern, confederate flag, adopt

and one of those is sherman. and grant has lip tagsmitations. some are fail because of a -- because inept field commander. you know, the bench of effective field commander

and one of those is sherman. and grant has lip tagsmitations. some are fail because of a -- because inept field commander. you know, the bench of effective field commander is low. grant has political imperatives he has to respect. but that is a good subtle argument of too much credit. >> another reason that he quits his job, you mention lincoln. lincoln was -- just so thrilled to have a general that was at least aggressive. and, lincoln also -- was -- had more of the annihilation to be look you want to -- his generals to attack lee's army. not necessarily take richmond. which i know mcclellan was more about taking richmond. and lincoln needed somebody who would do something, whether he won or not. >> man not so much grant's doing as it is lincoln's. mr. connors. >> grant's biggest failings are tactical, not strategic. he is strategically very good. but tactically less so. in, for example, that again, wilderness in sharpsburg.wilder flanks turned. that denotes bad tactical skills. >> cold harbor. >> cold harbor. battle of the angle. >> that's not

then a captain, linus sherman. one of the things i found, we interesting letters written by union soldiers who came in. they knew they were observing a history in the making so they h wrote letters and sent them home. the army upmail, the northern an mails were fum of these letters from the first few days of ew en occupation. linus sherman was a very a perspective nuew englander who e glad ople generally ar to see us. a not i suppose from much of a e union sentiment, but because bet they suffered so much. hu probably a fair characterization. even those whot supported the ya southern cause were beaten downh warn out and hungry, and they were happy to see the yankees cp come in and help fight the fireg they weren't happy with the result, but sherman was perceptive in defining their e sentiments. i guess onend of the most poignu scenes comes with a man named garland white. he was a chaplain with the 28th usct.fight usct stands for united states ra colored troop, african-american men recruited to fight with the union a

and we've got pictures of the smoking police can't prove it. >>> mike sherman cbs five. you might leaves again and can quell a and a picture is a tool for they deserve a since she part. sports is on deck. the this oil matt king returned to the mound for the first time since is one that masterpiece against the pirates his counterparts and add the fillets version of picasso is just as 7 5 pence he tapped into the tent in set out for nine scoreless innings and didn't get the win back-to-back nine innings set out for a king in the state scoreless until the bottom of the 11th to lawn for malcolm brown whose singles just over the head of fidelity is it brand and help comes home and the giants win one to nothing. a's and angels first inning tattoo'' the urban center and a curve ball a three run homer for says this oakland winds behind eight scoreless innings from bargello, ron. but in japan and scores 31 he combined for 53 in the lakers win 99 to 87. the other ways had seven step down after 38 years sops early unsentimental leave the game over 1000 in summer as the main the nat

. >> he had received maps before death row inmate wesley sherman which have led to discovery of remains but this is different. >> the others have all been small. this is a big one. this has got a lot of information on it. what amazes me is how accurate. >> has offered -- for information that leads to victims tied the boat and now deceased lauren, authorities believe they may have killed dozens of people in the 80s and 90s. in february king county sheriff's investigators dug up a well and found three sets of remains. two sets identified as missing teens, joe ann and kimberly billy. >> this is doug on flood road. now, wesley keeps telling us to go to this well here. >> and the map also points to orchard next to a river where sherman claims another victim is burried. neighbors reportedly seeing the fbi in the area the bureau confirms they have been here and notes indicate dozens of potential sites dozens of victims. >> it says this is a list of the ones found, but there's many more unnamed victims in this area of map. >> this is the map itself, the actual size we did not in large. i talked

initial reconsans by sherman illustrated they could enkump up to a00,000 men. there were a lot of roads because it was an area of rural wilderness, landscape, small farms, subsistence farmers living on the plateau. but those roads afforded logistics and communications and what didn't exist the army could improve upon and build more roads. but suitable encampment ground, naturally defensible, as sherman described it. it was cut up, the top graphical relief that will encompass the area the union forces occupy which becomes the battlefield of shiloh, has a maximum elevation relief of 230 feet. the average is 50 to 80 feet with sloping grades of 40 to 70% on creeks and tributaries that cut up the plateau. so it's a rugged landscape shs and with only 625 acres on a cultivation, the area was covered in an old growth open forest, which would be a huge canopy. most americans have never encountered what was the old growth forest. but if you can imagine most of the trees being in excess of 100 years to 200 years old that covered the landscape. you would have the mar shi

northern strategic victories of the war do indeed entitle faragut to equal status with grant and sherman in winning the war. allegiance to the united states in the sectional conflict was an open question. although he had served under the american flag for half a century, and had fought in the war of 1812, and the mexican war, under that flag -- a similar record was true of other southern-born officers who chose to go with the confederacy. faragut had been born and raised in tennessee. had married a woman from virginia. after his first wife died, he married another virginia woman, in 1843. when he was not at sea, he lived in norfolk. as the sectional conflict heated up, he said to friends in virginia, god forbid i should ever have to raise my hand against the south. but when abraham lincoln called out the militia after the confederate as tacked fort sumter, faragut express add prufl -- expressed approval of that action. his neighbors told him any one holding that opinion could not continue to live in norfolk. then faragut replied, i can live some where else. he decided to move to new york

it is actually a confederate woman who was sick and tired of the war. >> and she was handing sherman a plan? >> well she gave it to the government, to the war department. >> no, i have never -- never -- >> in any of your research you haven't? >> i have not. there are many claims about, and some verifiable about -- confederate women spies. passing significant military intelligence. in particular, campaigns, but that particular particular campaigns. no, i have never heard. have you? sounds like better fiction than history. you made reference to the movie cold mountain. i thought there might have been scenes that were over the top. such as torturing the woman to the fence. are you saying it was accurate? >> the person who is going to speak tomorrow is the woman who first wrote about these documents and there are almost liter literal transcriptions and this is the kind of situation where there was so much torture. they were so desperate to round up these gorillas and sends out troops with orders and they were claiming they were acting on the governor's authority. and they into the women

sherman oaks, california, in san fernando valley. i have the biggest sweet tooth ever.i have to make a trip here to blizz frozen yogurt. there seems to be a celebrity tie-in to almost everything here in beverly hills. and blizz is no exception. blizz is known for its frozen yogurt, but crepes, smoothies, and waffles are also on the menu. in fact, i'll give you a little taste. all right. i'm no expert in the kitchen, but today i'm going to show you just how i like my crepes with a little help from tom. and then we use the spatula. all right. we got half of it. >> perfect. >> now we go in for the kill. some of my favorite toppings, chocolate. and of course, raspberry sauce. we're ready! let's go. and this is my favorite part. time to dive in. delicious! kareen wynter, cnn, sherman oaks, california. >>> other stories making headlines right now, some of the things our affiliates are covering, in fact. a seventh grader in charlotte, north carolina, claims she got a unique punishment for skipping class. >> she told us that we was going to have to clean the bathrooms. >> maria

many, many years ago that a maryland woman wrote the tennessee plan, which was actually the plan sherman started in tennessee and went all the way to savannah. and in all of your -- well, have you heard anything about that? >> no, i have not. >> that she was actually a confederate woman who was sick >> and she was handing sherman a plan? >> well, she gave it to the government, to the war department. >> no, i have never -- i have never -- >> in any of your research you haven't? >> no. i've never seen that claim. i mean, there are many claims about, and some verifiable, about confederate women spies passing significant military intelligence. in particular campaigns. but that particular claim, no, i have not heard. have any of you guys heard that one? >> thank you. >> sorry. it sounds better fiction than history maybe that one. >> you made reference to the movie "cold mountain." >> yes. >> the first time i saw it, i thought it was preposterous, this couldn't have happened. and then i read some research that said, yeah, a lot of it was true. i thought there might have been scenes that were o

the federal army is -- and sherman has some doing with this. the federal -- the union army is basically caught napping to some degree. but how does grant retrieve the situation? wigley refers to it as a character trait. grant doesn't panic. so he recovers, but it doesn't mean that he's flawless operationally, doesn't mean he is flawless tactically. >> i think he's got the nerve. mcclellan breaks and burnside breaks, all of these generals break, but shiloh doesn't break, the wilderness when he gets outflanked he doesn't break, he withdraws and stabs again. >> how does that relate to having the big picture? how do those two connect? >> he loses the battle doesn't mean he's done. >> yes. >> he's able to get over the fact and go on to the next one. >> you have your -- and this is a traditional military historian's argument why you focus. wigley uses it. who is the contrasting figure on this question of character? who is the guy who gets the strategy right but due to a moral failing, that's basically the way 19th century america sees it, doesn't suc

cloris someone like roger sherman is said never said a stupid thing in his life. as a conservative moderating influence he said we're not have a bad. the people will never agree. or john rutledge who would later serve on the supreme court basically wins the war of independence he said no. i will work in south carolina at. the need to modify. that is what happens in philadelphia a. it was called a miracle. nobody was sure it would get out that it appeared it would die before the middle of summer 1787. is the large states against the small states. madison is from a large state. not the real issue. the real issue is what type of government? national or federal? today we have a federal government they did not call it that. sherman and rutledge said we wanted federal government that madison wanted a national government. there is a difference. federal was general only with general purposes in mind everything else left to the states that is what that generation argued for. of the national government to put all power with the central authority. made you start talking you

the people like dickinson and sherman at rutledge said we don't want a national government. we want a federal government. james madison wanted a national government. there's a difference. the federal government was a general government, meaning it only a general purposes in mind and that basically everything else was left to the states themselves. and that's what the majority of the founding generation argued for. not a national government which basically put all power in the center of 40. they weren't going to have that. so when you start talking about general versus federal and national versus federal, these are important terms. and the fact they haven't gone away. you still hear the terms the united states is a nation today, and so that term is still thrown around. the founding generation was a is for general purposes. i will talk about that in the preamble in a few minutes. so when the constitution came out of philadelphia in september 1787, no one was even sure that the thing would get ratified. they had written it, talked about it, sweated over it. they have poured the