if vandorn's army was in the union rear, cutting the union off from missouri, didn't that mean that curtis' army was in the confederate rear and was now cutting the confederates off from arkansas? indeed it did. with disastrous consequences as we'll see. so while this change of front was in progress, curtis, spoiling attacks, they broke up the confederate movements. threw the confederates into confusion, caused the confederates to fall behind schedule. vandorn organized counter attacks that forced the federals back only slowly and at great cost in lives. mcculluck was killed. as was brigadier general james mcintyre of arkansas. price was wounded. several brigade and regimental commanders were lost as well. when night came after the first day, the confederates gained a few hundred yards of meaningless terrain. ter ran. but they were in complete disarray. and they also were desperately hungry. most had not eaten now for two full days. and this in subfreezing temperatures. but worst of all they were nearly out of ammunition. and wouldn't you know it, the ammunition train had fallen behind dur

the fall ofy richmond was at the hospital ed when some union officers went to, they were met at the here hospital by the uniformed co confederate army doctorsn to su formally surrender and there's a story that the confederate, one of the confederate surgeons kne one of the union officers from n before the war, which is probably true, but he an orderly bring out a tray of mint jewel i g juleps. that's a great story.n, but it sounds too good to be true. yes, sir? >> you mentioned n earlier thats think dickinson, the woman's k name. >> yes. >> was kind of surprised when all this happened. >> yes. >> was that a typical reaction or did she have her head in the sand? >> there were a lot of people, including jefferson davis and e even to some extent robert e. lee hoping things would turn out differently. i cite her as an example. s a largeee segment of people dido their heads in the sand and didn't want to see what was o coming and other people talk ana evac ways acuation and feared i. a range of opinion.a the government actually made some effort of evacuation a week or so before the fall of the city but didn't do it with enough energy eit

price, of course, was a a union army in southwest missouri at that time of the year. price, of course, was a army in missouri at that time of the year. price, of course, was that time of the year. price, of course, was that time year. price, of course, was that tim year. price, of course, was a politician. not a soldier. he had no formal military training. and he had seen only very limited action in new mexico during the mexican war. and he had all sorts of personal and professional shortcomings. most notably, an utter lack of administrative skills. price may have been at the head of his army. he was never running his army. the army was not a confederate force, a pro-confederate, independent, missouri state guard. a rag tag force of maybe 7,000 8,000 men at this time. the missouri state guard was the only true militia army in the civil war. like all militia forces it was deficient in leadership, in organization, training, and logistical sport. volunteers provided their own arms and ammunition, clothing, equipment, and they pretty much came and went as they saw fit. now

these were the same armies remember that had combined the previous august to overwhelm the smaller union army at wilson's creek. natural attrition and necessity of garrisoning springfield and other locations had shrunk curtis' army down to around 10,000 men. and then there was the very disturbing matter of logistics. the isolated union army now, in benton county, arkansas, was 200 miles south of its supply base at raleigh. despite quarter master sheridan's heroic efforts, the supply situation was tenuous. it was very uncertain whether the union army could remain where it was, it certainly couldn't go any further. curtis, therefore, determined to hold his ground in arkansas, take up a blocking position, and prevent the confederates from returning to missouri. he rode all over benton county and he noticed a line of rocky, limestone bluffs behind a body of water called little sugar creek. these bluffs ran east/west and they were five miles south of the missouri state line. below the bluffs was a creek. the top of the bluffs was the beginning of a rolling table land. it had no formal name. but cu

apparently johnston believed that is the realization that the confederate leaders understood the union army to be facing west as opposed to south. in other words, when the confederates planned the attack, planned the offensive, it is with an understanding that the union forces are west of pittsburg landing and facing west. because the confederates believed that corinth is further west than it is south from pittsburg landing. they have a slight miscalculation in their understanding of the geography and their maps illustrate this. their maps show corinth twice as far from east to west, from pittsburg landing than it is by miles north and south. we now know that the exact opposite is true. we know that corinth was tries as far north to south from pittsburg landing than it was from east to west. that little terrain perspective, confederates are marching from the west, slightly north, but generally eastward, led the confederate high command into assuming the army faced west. retreat to the river. you would not, you would not logically, if you knew the federal army faced south, deploy with your a

and that getting ready is the saving grace to a large extent to how the union army is going to encounter the confederates in the battle. so the supplies is not quite as complete as they would have desired, but it's still a major surprise on the united states army. johnston's mission was every effort we made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut his line of retreat to the tennessee river and force him back on owl creek where he'll be obliged to surrender. so he's envisioning striking union left first, turning it, cutting off that viable retreat to the tennessee river and then using the mass of his army to drive grant's army back into the swamps to the north and destroy them. that's what that obliged to surrender mean in johnston's battle orders. he's going to force them to surrender or destroy them in detail. he completely envisions a battle of anie lags. he's trying to win. neutralize grant so he can deal with all these other problems. so this confederate force has a mission and that mission is to turn the union left flank. only the confederate high command knows that mission.

and among other things, asked douglass to become the leader after effort in cooperation with the union army and the war department to funnel as many slaves as possible out of the border states, out of the upper south behind union lines and into the north if possible. a grandiose plan that god knows how this would ever work but to get as many slaves out of the upper south as possible before election day in november because if he loses the election, he fears that mcclellan and the democrats will turn around the policy of emancipation and the war will be lost. douglas was stunned. i don't know another way to put it. here was abraham lincoln. he had attacked lincoln for the past two and a half years, three years. here was lincoln looking eye to eye with him and said will you funnel as many slaves out of the south as possible, be a new sort of john brown for me? douglass said sure. thank you very much. he went back up north. he sent telegrams, letters all across the north. he was trying to put together a team of people and he did for a week or two that would sort of be the agents of this system.

army faced west. the battle plan was to turn the union left first to cut off the retreat to the river. you would not, you would not logically, if you knew the federal army faced south, deploy with your army facing east, if your primary mission was to turn the union left first. that misunderstanding has a great deal to do with our understanding of why it's fought the way it is. and why troops maneuver the way they do. and why he brought so much of the weight of his army to bear against this point. because he believes that he has struggled. he believes in the initial maneuver that he has earninged that. and by 9:00 when his troops are entering this union camp, that mass having driven 5400 men out of it, that he has indeed cut grant's retreats to the tennessee river. because having brought half the army to bear here, he still by knowing how his army is deployed and knowing troops to his left are engaged. they are engaged at shiloh church against sherman's division, that his visual understanding is i have moved up, and i am now inside east of where my left is engaged union forces at the chu

just a few days after the union army arrives there, as we'll see, a relief convoy appears. so to make a little more -- to flesh out that narrative a little bit more, with no necessity now of shielding missouri from a confederate army that has disappeared, curtis invades arkansas in earnest. logistical problems hampered the movement and then he turned away. and in the process, which is a point i really want to emphasize, somewhere there in that final week, curtis made a momentous decision, he realized his supply line was more of an incumberance than in addition. it was lightly populated, but there were enough farms to provide food to keep his army afleet. so curtis made the momentous and extremely risky decision to sever his own supply line and to live off the southern country side as he marched eastward, and for two weeks in june, 1862, the army of the southwest operated independently of a base of supplies. it fed itself as it move aid long. this was the first time in the civil war an army attempted such a maneuver, and it would not be repeated again until 11 months had pass

at various points, the union army's in and some slaves retreat with them but not hers. and then the emancipation proclamation is passed and a union officer comes to their farm and demands his right to take away a slave woman and her children who belong to a man who has already gone. it's virginia. so the families didn't all live on the same farms. and, basically, this slave man had escaped to the union army and sent back a white officer to collect his wife and children. he didn't go to his wife's plantation himself.

the union army is hot mapping to some degree. but how does grant retrieve the situation? why he sort of refers to it as a character trait. he doesn't panic. he recovers. i doesn't mean he's flawless. did you -- >> i think that he's got the nerve. mcclellan breaks and burnside breaks. shiloh doesn't break. wilderness when he gets flanks, he doesn't break. he withdraws and stabs again. >> and how does that relate to the big picture? how do those two connect? >> if he loses the battle doesn't necessarily mean he's done. he's able to get over it and move to the next one. who is a contrasting figure on this question of character? who is the guy who gets the strategy right but due to a moral failing -- i mean, that's basically the way 19th century americans are seeing it doesn't succeed. it's mcclellan. what's widely's evaluation of the concept of mcclellan's peninsula campaign? >> it's pretty positive. he doesn't have the guts to follow it through. >> exactly. and not only that. what doeswi widely talk about? >> there's a lot less revolutionary. so there weren't any changes. s

so, when johnston overrun prentice's camp in 1862, he will have brought half of his army to bear upon that union division camp, over the course of the first four hours of combat, half of the confederate army, eight of 16 brigades maneuvered to the right-wing of the confederate attacking force and that is what overruns benjamin prentice at 9:00 a.m., four brigades on the direct assault with four coming up in close support. 5400 federals against half confederate army. and now you know why ben prentice's division basically nearly ceases to exist at 9:00 a.m. on the morning of april 1862. then something amazingly happens. it's amazing because it will influence the remainder of the fight from that point on. johnston will initially detach six soon just five of the eight brigades to now move left and northwest from prentice's camps. is that map still up? i see myself. can you play it again? so, five of eight brigades move to his left and northwest. he has six of those brigades on his left flank. six. six and five from 16. that's 11 of 16 brigades. 11 of 16 federal brigades are maneuvering and actively

for more than a year, the civil war had raged, and the union army of the potomac had only known a series of sharp defeats. many casualties were high, and the means of caring for them tragically inadequate. hundreds who could have been saved died in the field for lack of proper care. already a part of history were the battles which we know as bull run, the seven days and jackson's valley campaign. each had been a costly failure for the union forces, and in the north people began to wonder if the south could be defeated and the union preserved. in the most tragic and bitterly punitive fighting our nation has ever known, american fought against american, and the casualty lists for both sides skyrocketed as on american hills and in american valleys cannon and musket flung their hot metal among the men and horses of both sides. the spectacle of suffering was piteous, perhaps especially so to clara barton for she decided to do something about it. the already spare face of the man in the white house seemed to grow even more gaunt under a constant flood of criticism and urgent demands for an ear

lincoln sent word to the chief of the union army. general gorge mcclellan had been a disgrace after his campaign. now, lincoln summoned him back. his orders, stop lee at all costs. those costs were to be high. on september 17th, 1862, union and confederate forces would meet at antedum creek. more than 100,000 men would be involved in a bloody battle. and one woman, clara barton, would carve for herself a unique place in the annals of service to mankind. the day the battle began however, she was just a dedicated woman driving a wagon full of provisions across the maryland country side. years later, she would recall that day and retell it in our own words. >> with my attendant, i sought the hill tops and as the mist cleared away and the morning sun broke over the maryland heights, its rays fell upon the forms of dying men. many of you may never hear bugle notes which call men to battle, but if like us, you have heard them that grim september morning as they rang through the valley, they would have lingered in your ears as they do in mi

but those roads afforded logistics and communications and what didn't exist the union army could improve upon and build more roads. but suitable encampment ground, naturally defensible, as sherman described it. it was cut up, the top graphical relief that will encompass the area the union forces occupy which becomes the battlefield of shiloh, has a maximum elevation relief of 230 feet. the average is 50 to 80 feet with sloping grades of 40 to 70% on creeks and tributaries that cut up the plateau. so it's a rugged landscape ,and with only 625 acres on a cultivation, the area was covered in an old growth open forest, which would be a huge canopy. this was old growth forest. most americans have never encountered what was the old growth forest. but if you can imagine most of the trees being in excess of 100 years to 200 years old that covered the landscape. you would have the marshy zones and the creek valleys which would be choked with denser vegetation. in general, an old growth, open forest, high canopy. the average line of sight even under the canopy, was, say, maybe 100 to 200 yards. it

the union army loses casualties, by and large, where an army they should lose take casualties after the company, regimental and brigade level. the union generals pay a price. but by and large, it's the junior guys who are supposed to be out on the fighting line who are killed or wounded. and as a result, you know, mead has to start moving guys around. captains are temporarily commanding regiments. you've got to sort all this out. and men are exhausted. now, on the confederate side instead of the army of northern virginia, they're so into that chivalry and leading from the front even by generals, gettysburg loses 15 general officers killed or wounded. and they can't afford it. they can't afford it. it's just absolutely tragic for them and a great loss. but anyway, mead gets underway in a pursuit gingerly as soon as he can, but he's got -- if he's going to follow robert e. lee, he's got to follow him with an army capable of actually fighting. now, is given command of the army of the potomac by lincoln. everybody in washington easterfyed. his -- terrified. his mission is to defeat lee and

and the slave man had escaped to the union army and sent back a white officer to collect his wife and children. and the mistress says by what right and he waves the paper and says by the right of the president of the united states of america. and there i

at various points the union army's in and some slaves retreat with them but not hers. and then the emancipation proclamation is passed and a union officer comes to their

relative to being on the west bank of the tennessee with their backs to a river, nevertheless the union army -- which i think supports what you are saying, larry -- is well protected on its flanks by these swollen streams. and it really limits what the attacking army is able to do with the situation. i'm not trying to say that that determines the outcome of the battle, but it certainly puts them in a difficult spot. >> maybe just following up on that, why do you think -- you know, one of the issues is always beauregard's role in this. and buearegard and johnson worked together. why the battle formation the confederates chose. considering they were trying to sweep around the union army and push them into the swamps, why did they choose the battle formation they did? and if you were a confederate general that day, what battle formation might you have chosen instead or would you have used the same one? simple question, right? i may not come out of this alive if i ask the wrong questions. >> well, again -- and i'll be the guinea b

the smaller proportion of his army against what is the other half of the union army, and that other half constitutes grant's center and true left flank. >>> we're almost two miles from the crossroads north of shiloh church. that brings us all the way over what is the true union left flank representing grant's army of the tennessee. this is colonel david stewart's brigade of sherman's fifth division. stewart had been detached throughout the encampment period. sherman was the first division to occupy. he was over here guarding the hamburg road from hamburg landing which is four river miles upstream from pittsburgh landing. so this is where his brigade will fight the battle detached from its mother division. prentiss' camps were roughly a mile or a little over from the southwest or to our southwest about a mile. that will give you a sense of where prentiss' camps were in relationship to stewart which represents the true union left and what johnston envisioned to be the union left, which was prentiss' camps. stewart fights desperately to hold this flank. stewart will find himself down to jus

army. but as bob crick reminded us, it was not really a good dayall jat to play and decided not to. the union general, mcclellan, after glendale, sent this message to the war department. notice the tone. i shall do my best to save the army. but we know that well before the battles of glendale and malverne hill, george mcclellan's conception of how victory could be won was badly shaken. in this larger context our noted historian once again provides his insights into the character of this general who was actually just too closely wedded to his preconceived notions of how war should be fought. in a chapter with a marvelous title the historian writes, the failure of mcclellan's peninsula campaign was not alone a military failure. it represented also the downfall of the limited war for limited ends that mcclellan favored. from now on the north would fight not to preserve the old union but to destroy it and build a new one on its ashes. a concept so dear to men like mcclellan when eventually reconciliation some sort of gentleman's agreement was being washed away by increasing tides of blood, tens o

and basically, this slave man had escaped to the union army and sent back a white officer to collect his wife and children. he didn't go to his wife's plantation himself. and the officer comes on the plantation. it's february 1863. and he comes on the plantation wafth t waving the emancipation proclamation. and he says, i want this man's wife and children, forinda and her children. and the mistress says by what right? and he waves the paper and he says, by the right of the president of the united states of america. and there is this immediate difference in how people are able to leave because now the union army's coming and offering them protection to leave whereas before they had to leave on their own. so it makes an enormous difference, but i'm not -- i think it just accelerates a military drain that the confederacy's already suffering from. i mean, clayburn writes this thing at the end of 1863. and that's the other thing. as you well know, it's far quick er here in the mississippi valley and the tennessee valley than it is in virginia. yes. >> i had a question. so in your first bo

army should have been destroyed. that's what he was after. well, at that point the union called upon john pope to command something called the army of virginia up -- back up at manassas. and with the combination of new troops and mcclellan's troops, lee sent jackson with one wing of his army to occupy pope and with longstreet and another wing fell upon him and maybe this was lee's greatest battle, second manassas. almost destroyed pope. this was august 30th, 1862. at that point lee confessed. the army is not properly equipped for an invasion of the enemy's territory. it lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced and the men poorly provided with clothes and in thousands of instances, destitute of shoes. still, we cannot afford to be idle. and though weaker than our opponents in men and material and military equipment, we must endeavor to harass if we cannot make our success -- our complete success is not impossible and we shall endeavor to guard from law. so, he's going to maryland. he writes to davis, and this is lee's r

because now the union army is coming and offering them protect to leave. so it makes a big difference but i think it accelerates a milt drain that the confedracy is suffering from. it is far quicker here in the mississippi valley and tennessee valley than it is in virginia. >> i had a question so in your first book you talk about how the wealthy class of planters appeal to the yomen and convince them to go to war. once we get into the war were there class divisions or was there a similar rallying cry that the men used to go to war. you know, well, in this whole bunch of collar scholarship which it sounds like you know very well. and you know, i find this hard to believe. i love drew's work, but this i find hard to believe. i mean the women whose defects from the confederate cause has consequences i think are the yomen and poor white women. who knows what they thought. if you read the political coverage before the war, each side claims that the women are with them. we don't all act or think one way. it has to do with family or region or class. so i think th

chase and stanton will actually cruise around hampton roads and he's found a spot where the union army can land to capture norfolk. once norfolk is gone, the confederate ship is untenable. lincoln orders this attempt to be made. in fact, lincoln actually gets to see the merrimac come down the river to investigate some shelling that the union maybe is doing, and there's conflicting reports. the union reports say that merrimac shows up, we withdrew trying to lure her further down so that vanderbilt and the other big rams could get a shot at her where the confederates say, well, the union saw the merrimac come and go fled. they all went to hide under the guns of fortress monroe. the union landing does take place, norfolk does fall, and on may 11 the confederates blow up the merrimac. in fact, solomon p. chase, who finds it sometimes reluctant to praise abraham lincoln writes to his daughter saying, if lincoln had not come down, the merrimac would probably still be as great a terror as previously. lincoln's presence and his forceful insistence that something be done actually garnered resul

the union army is still here. the confederate army falls back to corinth and both sides are in the same positions they were when the battle began, but grant had not been defeated. buel made the juncture and the railroads lay waiting for the next union strike. >> you can watch this or other american history tv programs on the civil war at any time by visiting our website c-span.org/history. >> as commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the civil war continues, join us every saturday at 6 and 10 p.m. and sundays at 11 a.m. for programs featuring the civil war. for more information about american history tv on c-span 3 including our complete schedule, go to c-span.org/history. to keep up with us during the week or send us questions and comments follow us on twitter. we're at twitter.com/cspanhistory. >>> each week american history tv sits in on a lecture with one of the nation's college professors. you can watch the classes here every saturday at 8 p.m. and midnight eastern and sundays at 1 p.m. this week former gen

alerted to the need to rally the army and so it will be better part of two hours of getting the troops out and maneuvered into positions in which they can engage this union force coming down upon them. things fall apart rapidly on the confederate left once grant is able to bring to bear the elements, the surviving elements of his army. when sherman and mcclen an cross truman branch and join wallace in the matter of an hour between 10:00 and 11:00 in the morn they turn the confederate left and backwards towards shiloh church. by noon they are knocking on the door and they will be joined by the extreme right elements of buel's command under mccook, and the fighting that point in time will cease north of shiloh church as beauregard is collecting fragmentg commands and reorganizing them and on several instances personally leading them forward into the attack. staff officers will see him grab colors of disorganized units and rally them in and ride forward in the face of the federal fire and they're just beside themselves because judge u.s. that morning the body of johnston had been put in the wagon and taken south, trailed by his staff and all they can imagin

union numerical advantage. the confederates will have to safely redeploy. they're actually reinforced and attacking back. beauregard will be alerted to the need to rattle the army, and it will be a better part of two hours of getting the troops out and maneuvered into position in which they can engage this union force coming down upon them. things fall apart rapidly on the confederate left. one, grant is able to bring to bear the elements, the surviving elements of his army. when sherman and mcclarnon joined the field, within the matter of an hour, they were able to turn the confederate left and turn it back southward toward shiloh's church. by noon the confederates are knocking on the door of the shiloh church. they'll be joined there by the extreme right element under alexander mccook, and the fighting at that point in time will cease all north of shiloh church as beauregard is collecting fragmented demands dripping off the front, reorganizing them, and on several instances, personally leading them forward into the attack. staff officers will see him grab colors of disorganized units, rally the men and just ride forward in the face of federal fire, and they'r

landing in close proximity to the railroads and corinth junction, but he had three additional union armies pressuring his defenses. he had one in arkansas, he had pope on the river, had just taken new madrid and the force here and buell in the ohio and was maneuvering through tennessee. halleck had ordered a concentration of grant's force with buell. the plan would be once the two armies were within supporting distance, then halleck would come into the field from st. louis, take command of the whole and they would carry out the mission of cutting the vital railroads. to do that, they knew they would probably have to contest with the principle army for the confederates. they knew that the forces were concentrating and that the concentration was occurring in front of grant here in proximity to the tennessee river in direct defense of the railroads. the key word is defense. the union high command believed the confederates were on their heels in a defensive posture and were not concentrating for offensive purposes. and in that regard, it was a total misread. one of the issues confronting alber

how many times would you have heard that from union army commanders at this stage of the war? maybe from one other, whose name, last name has five letters, starting with g. but not from most of the others. but it was becoming the slogan of the navy and especially of faragut. at 2:00 a.m. on april 24th, 17 of his ships carrying 154 guns, weighed anchor and began moving up river. with faragut's flag ship, uss hartford, in the middle of three divisions of the fleet in which the smaller gun boats were in the first and third divisions, and the larger ones in the middle divisions. the mortar fleet and five gun boats that towed them stayed behind and opened a furious fuselage to keep down the fire of the forts. while the ships of the three divisions also opened fire as they approached the forts. these forts began firing on the ships as they approached. and as the first ships got through, the confederate gun boats, above the forts, also engaged. in this melee, scores of shells were in the air and exploding at the same time in what was surely the most spectacular fireworks display in a

lee, then grant, who commanded the union army. >>> april 15th, 1912, nearly 1500 perish. >> once the look outs sounds, an iceberg ahead, struck the bells three times. ding, ding, ding, which is a warning saying there's some object ahead. doesn't mean dead. means ahead. doesn't say what kind of object. what the lookout then did, he went to a telephone and called town to tell what it is they saw and the phone would finally answer, the entire conversation was what do you see? and the response was iceberg right ahead and the response from the officer was thank you. >> samuel helper on the truths and myths of that night. sunday, 4:00 p.m. eastern this weekend on cspan 3. >>> next, a biography about general douglas macarthur who served in world war ii. his military career came to a close in 1951 when president harry s. truman releahed him of his command. this was produced in 1952 by the army pictorial center. >>> the united states army presents a big picture. an official report produced for the armed forces and the american people. now to show you part of the big picture, here is sergeant

when with general lee was the command of the union army in the spring of 1861, did he have inkling that he would take over command of the southern army? >> i don't think so. i think he turned it down because there was some irony here because he really just did not like conflict. he doesn't respond well to conflict and he does so because he can't handle conflict, what kind of conflict, you ask. he would have had war on his neighbors and relatives and he's going to do that. he would have spent the rest of his life explaining to the people he cared about and loved why he had turned on them and so i think he really thought he was fighting and offering himself his professional experience and capacity for his friends and neighbors. professor thomas and take calls, archibald is in jackson, mississippi. archibald, go ahead with your comments or question? >> and southern virginia right where jeff stewart was born. by the grace of god i'm a virginian. he came back and married a southern bell from virginia and it was concerned by this last caller, jennifer to equate, with the example of the educat

the union army is still here, confederate army falls back to coren. both sides are in the same positions they were when the battle began. but grant had not been defeated. buell had made the juncture and those railroads lay waiting for the next union strike. >> you can watch this or other american history tv programs on the civil war at any time by visiting our web site, cspan.org/history. >>> as commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the civil war continues, join us every saturday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. and sundays at 11:00 a.m. for programs featuring the civil war. for more information about american history tv on cspan-3, including our complete schedule, go to cspan.org/history. to enter your questions, follow us on twitter. we're on twitter.com/cspanhistory. >>> an air of mystery has surrounded this bronze likeness of alexander hamilton since the day it was unveiled in 1923. there is a definitive book on the sculpture in washington, d.c. president warren harding made reference to an anonymous donor. might it possibly have been the gift of andrew

on this day in 1861, the union army surrendered south carolina's fort sumter ending the first battle trouble had been brewing for sometime between the north and the south largely over slavery. just a few months earlier, a number of southern states had succeeded from the united states and after the confederates captured fort sumter, the following four years of carnage killed more than 600,000 soldiers and, of course, the union army won the war thanks in large part to the leadership of president lincoln. but the confederate flag flew 151 years ago today. and now you know the news. for this friday, the 13th of april, 2012. we're all back on monday for "studio b" and "fox report." "fox report weekend" tomorrow. for the journalists of fox news, i'm shepard smith. thanks for trusting us your news and informatio

relative to being on the west bank of the tennessee with their backs to a river, nevertheless the union army -- which i think supports what you are saying, larry -- is well protected on its flanks by these swollen streams. and -- it really -- limits what the -- what at taking army is able to do with that situation. i'm not frying to say that -- that determines the outcome of the battle. it certainly put them

no other union operation at this stage of the war lasted as long, covered as much territory, or achieved its objectives as effectively. the army of the southwest secured missouri, freed union resources for use elsewhere, and dealt confederate arkansas and slavery a heavy blow. few other civil war operations anywhere had such an impact on the course of events. it truly was a campaign worth commemorating, worth remembering, and i'm so glad that so many of you have come out tonight while we've had this little discussion. thank you so much. >> thank you very much for coming, and you are dismissed. >>> as commemoration of the 150th anniversary of the civil war continues, join us every saturday at 6:00 and 10:00 p.m. and sundays at 11:00 a.m. for programs featuring the civil war. for more information about american history tv on c-span3, including our complete schedule, go to c-span.org/history. and to keep up with us during the week send us questions or comments, follow us on twitter. we're at twitter.com/cspanhistory. >>> thamerican history tv where can find our schedules and preview our upcoming programs. watch featured video fro