so farragut took his beloved flagship "hartford" to vicksburg in june 1862. and when i will go back down again god only knows he wrote to one of his naval colleagues. it appears the department is under the belief that it is easier for me to encounter the difficulties of the mississippi and ascend a thousand miles against a strong current than it is for foot and davis with vessels constructed for the river to come down the stream. farragut's reference here was to andrew hull foot and charles e. davis and to the western flotilla of ironclad river gunboats built by eads of st. louis and supported by the timber clads which it worked with the army on the tennessee and cumberland rivers and moved into the mississippi where they helped capture island number ten and had destroyed the confederate river defense fleet at memphis and captured that city in early june 1862. foot had been wounded in the ankle at fort donaldson and by may 1862, his wound was giving him so much trouble that he took a leave and was replaced by charles davis. at the end of june and beginning of

vicksburg is seen as a complete disaster. no one says vicksburg is good. the same thing occurs to some degree after ankita but he stays an extra day and is able to kind of say this is a draw and mcclellan doesn't attack him. it is partly mcclellan. almost dares mcclellan to attack the day after the battle and makes the mistake and refuses and probably could have destroyed the army on the spot. this is the importance of psychological factors and if you're going to defend lee the way gallagher does, you'll put heavier premium on these things that lee is able to build a culture of winning. he has to take risks and there are positive effects to. this as late as '64 the army of northern virginia is still going to be a very effective fighting force partly because the culture was built before. you wouldn't have built that culture of winning if you had done the fabian strategy that washington would have done because, yes, you can rationally explain it to them. mr. conners, do you want to push back on that. >> a culture of winning is as useful as it is but even the

donaldson or vicksburg or chattanooga or gettysburg or antietam. any of those national cemeteries, logically the soldiers are buried in close proximity to where they were originally failed. where they fell. so it's going to be on the battlefield itself. so in kind of a roundabout way, although they were not doing it in terms of preservation, they were actually preserving part of the battlefield when they reburied those dead at shiloh national cemetery. and you see that all around, even though the national cemetery at chattanooga, we're talking about tennessee here, was not most of the dead, a lot of the dead who come from chickamauga, of course, but it is actually on a part of the battle of chattanooga when union forces were attacking, one of the generals talks about how he could see the union line going up and over the small crest where the cemetery would eventually be. so the national cemetery first preservation movement, although it was not intended specifically for preservation, it was more memorial features than preservation, but it did, in pa

vicksburg is seen as a complete disaster in contrast. no one says vicksburg is good. the same thing occurs to some degree after antietam which is -- lee's army is mrauled but he stays an extra day and is able to kind of say this is a draw and mcclelland doesn't attack him. that's partly mcclelland. lee almost dares him to attack the day after the battle and mcclelland makes the mistake and refuses. possibly could have destroyed lee's army on the spot, but there is -- and this is the importance of psychological factors and if you're going to defend lee the way gallagher does you'll put a heavier premium on these things that lee is able to build this culture of winning so he has to take risks and there are positive effects to this. as late as '64 the army of northern virginia will be an effective fighting force. but you wouldn't have built that culture of winning if you had done the fabian strategy that washington would have done, all right. because men aren't going -- yes, you can rationally explain it. mr. conners, you want to push back on that. >> culture of winning

you see this at vicksburg, at chickam theauga, gettysburg, antietam as well. the later generation of parks created in the 1930s, 1940s you can't pinpoint to any degree of accuracy that you can at these earlier battlefields. so this was the golden age of shiloh, when this battlefield was established. it's part of a larger movement, but it's a key feature of our favorite battlefield here. now, there are later preservation efforts at shiloh, of course. we know about some of the major reconstruction that's done during the new deal, for instance, when the concrete roads go in, the visitor center that we visit today goes up at that time, the bookstore that's there now goes up at that time. later on mission 66, park service term, will create the bypass out there and do some additional things, add on to the visitor center and then of course there are later acquisitions. really we get into more in terms of the preservation story in the recent past. and just recently we've talked about fallen timbers and the 490-something acres that the trust is working on now. original

he decided to take most of the fleet up to vicksburg, including

vicksburg. you guys hopefully remember that. so you have here the goal to annihilate, at least in widely's interpretation, confederate military power by destroying armies. what does grant not always seek for? and this is why widely sees him as praiseworthy. >> he doesn't always look for a battle. he criticizes scott for going through unnecessary battles and losing men when he could have gone around objectives. >> in what war? >> the mexican war. >> yes. >> who is the exponent of napoleonic strategy? the chapter you read before that? it's lee. so grant wants to destroy -- and i want you to understand this. when he says a strategy of annihilation, he's not meaning a battle. he's meaning in this case he's basically saying the there are other aways of achieving the objective. generally, especially the objective is far less costly. what's the other thing that hasn't been put up here and involves this issue of noncombat tans? >> supplies. >> yes. >> all right. attacks on -- and how do you do that? let's not sugar coat it. >> you attac

vicksburg. okay. it's vicksburg. you probably hopefully remember that. you have here the goal is to annihilate at least in wigley's interpretation, confederate military power by destroying armies. the way to destroy armies are multiple versions. what does grant not always seek for and why wigley sees him as praise worthy. >> he doesn't always look for a battle. he criticizes scott for going through unnecessary battles and losing men. >> who is the exponent of the napoleonic strategy, the chapter you read before that in the book? it's lee. so, grant wants to destroy -- and i want you to understand this because when wigley says a battle of -- a strategy of annihilation, he's not means necessarily the battle. he's meaning, in this case he's basically saying there are other ways of achieving that objective which are more effective and generally especially the option of maneuver leading to seizure are less costly. what's the other thing that we put up -- that hasn't been put up here and involves noncombatives. >> supplies. >> attacks on -- how do you do that?

the vicksburg racial it occurs which is a which killed a bunch of black folks and pretty much removed them from politics even before the the state went democratic and he realizes that we can remove them from politics and so he switches back to being democratic and i'm sitting there reading this and saying ok this didn't happen then because republicans were terrible and were destroying the state quite the opposite it happened because they were succeeding they were building a an alliance that would have kept them in power and so the democrats used violence to threaten that now that would have been was at is stevens in the radical republicans and those folks and that and that that is absolute remarkable he was in pennsylvania with that he were in mississippi yeah but and to the thirteenth fourteenth and fifteenth yeah the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were passed then and the forty the members particularly his assault equal rights under the law and due process it's a i think it's a crown jewel of our constitution but of course it got forgotten from about eight hundred eighty in til

with the fall of vicksburg, that freed up a lot of soldiers to, you know, for other operations. at that point the federal high command decided it was time to go ahead and move against little rock. so several men, several troops came over from vicksburg to helena, and operations began to take little rock. there were 6,000 cavalry out of southeast arkansas that came down crowly's ridge and 6,000 infantry from helena that marched cross country. they met at clarendon and then continued on from there. but the majority of the fighting in this campaign was done by the cavalry on both sides, really by necessity for the confederates because their infantry was so torn up at helena, and there were so many desertions after that that they just were barely even a factor in the little rock campaign. john lynn davidson was the commander of the union cavalry, and he was, he was a virginian who remained loyal to the union after secession. he was a west pointer, and he brought regular army discipline to his volunteer soldiers. so he was not very popular at the start of this campaign. in fact, one

vicksburg is seeing a complete disaster in contrast. the same thing occurs to some degree after -- lee's army is mauled. but he stays an extra day. he'll able to say this is a draw. he almost dares him to attack. mccullen makes the mistake and refuses. this is the importance of psychological factors. and if you're going to defend lee the way gallagher does, you're going to put a heavier premium on these things. that lee is able to build the culture of winning. so he has to take risks. and there are positive effects to this. so the army of northern virginia will be effective fighting force. but you wouldn't have that culture of winning if you did the strategy that washington would have done. yes, you can rationally explain it to them. mr. kconners, you want to push back? >> a culture of winning as useful as it is. i think the description of them is like a bulldog whipped a t lot is used to getting whipped but will always keep fighting and keep fighting pretty hard. >> and will eventually win. >> and will eventually win. so there's a cult

until 11 months had passed when grant tried the same thing as he moved his army around jackson to vicksburg. grant gets a lot of credit for that. curtis gets no credit for what he did 11 months earlier. why do you suppose? because it happened in arkansas, the great black hole of american h hitiography. wartime journalists celebrated events in the east, they down played events in the west, and they basically ignored events in the trans-mississippi. when the war ended, historians simply continued that mindset, that attitude, that approach. things are changing now these last 20 years. there's a really good book on pea ridge here. everybody should have a copy. this development is new, and it's going to take a few decades, i think, before we really begin to grasp how important, how interesting, how significant events were in the trans mississippi. now, kurtz advertise was a modest man, a very methodical man. really he had the heart and soul of a civil engineer. he did not like to blow his own horn. he never made much of this revolution in military operations. inside curtis knew what he had accom

i would remind everyone that, the south lost an entire field army at vicksburg and they did not sue for peace. they simply kempt on fighting. so did it present a trap? maybe. even if there had been an overwhelming victory. i suspect that the north could have rebounded from that. >> okay. i might also in commenting, following up on that. think about how -- that -- that the -- well, relative to being on the west bank of the tennessee with their backs to a river, nevertheless the union army -- which i think supports what you are saying, larry -- is well protected on its flanks by these swollen streams. and -- it really -- limits what the -- what at taking army is able to do with that situation. i'm not frying to say that -- that determines the outcome of the battle. it certainly put them

tonight to hear excerpts from, "civil war campaign in the west," university of north carolina press, "vicksburg is the key, the struggle for the mississippi river," university of nebraska press, and "the virginia militia in the 17th century," louisiana state university press. let's give a good saline county welcome to dr. william l. shea. [ applause ] >> i understand that i am honorable to everyone in the room and possibly this part of the county. before i begin my canned presentation will somewhat tie me to my notes, i want to point out this masterpiece of cartography. almost arkansas. what the arrow depicts is essentially the movement of the united states army of the southwest in the first half of 1862 as that army moved from missouri, just off the top of the map, the board, through springfield, to the battle site at pea ridge, in benton county, arkansas, and then a long circuitous route almost, but not quite to little rock, probably to the cabot/jacksonville area today. and then looping back around and across the delta to helena on the mississippi river. and what we'll do tonight is explain

virginia, on saving virginia, on defending virginia, and was less concerned about what happened in vicksburg and the far west and chattanooga and all these other places -- >> okay, we've got it. >> anybody can answer it. >> very quickly, because lee is often charged with being virginia-centric in his view, and i think that's true. and he probably should have been. if you put yourself in lee's position, he'll spend year after year watching the confederate command west of the appalachians essentially disintegrate and shoot itself in the foot. a great army miserably led most of the time during the war. and lee has to ask himself, what good could he do if he acceded to jefferson davis' wishes in late 1863 and went out into that poison command center? could he have done any better? whereas he knew what he could have achieved with the army of virginia. i think lee is certainly aware of what was going on west of the age operations and towards the end of the war the general in chief. he'll exert minor influence in affairs outside virginia. but he knew where he was best used, and jefferson davis had

i would remind everyone that the south lost an entire field army at vicksburg and they did not sue for peace. they simply kept on fighting. so did it present a trap? maybe. even if there had been an overwhelming victory. i suspect that the north could have rebounded from that. >> okay. i might also, in commenting or following up on that, think about how -- that the -- well, relative to being on the west bank of the tennessee with their backs to a river, nevertheless the union army -- which i think supports what you are saying, larry -- is well protected on its flanks by these swollen streams. and it really limits what the attacking army is able to do with the situation. i'm not trying to say that that determines the outcome of the battle, but it certainly puts them in a difficult spot. >> maybe just following up on that, why do you think -- you know, one of the issues is always beauregard's role in this. and buearegard and johnson worked together. why the battle formation the confederates chose. considering they were trying to sweep around the union army and push them into the swamps,

he was captured south of vicksburg. and i loved that. every time i'd go up to visit my grandmother in east texas, she had a picture of me, i said, tell me more stories. i suspect some of those stories were actually true. but knowing my family, i also suspect that there was a little bit of embellishment in them. we need to focus on history because saving the documents that we have today is important. but it's also important to look at history as a method to kind of heal some wounds and maybe to bind us together a little bit and take those historical examples that are pertinent today. i'm a believer. i was in the legislature for six years and i concluded there are no new public policy issues. nothing's new. it's got different names and different players and different times. but it's the same stuff that's happened before. we can make historical associations with that. and we can show folks who have no interest in history or who ask the question, why do we need to save it, we can say, this is why we need to save it. it's applicable to what o

donaldson and vicksburg earned him promotion to the rank of major general and brief command of the army of tennessee. few of the war's political generals contributed as much to northern victory. after the war, logan organized the grand army of the republic and helped promote the first memorial day in 1868. he returned to congress serving three terms in the senate. 15 years after his death in 1886, this impressive tribute joined washington's growing company of civil war generals. in life, no stranger to controversy, some thought him too political a

dona donald'sburg and vicksburg earned him brief command of the army of tennessee. few of the wars political journals contributed as much to northern victory. after the war logan organized the grand army of the republic and helped promote the first memorial day in 1868. he returned to congress serving three terms in the senate. in 1884 he narrowly lost the vice presidency as james g. blaine's running mate. 15 years after his death in 1886, this impressive tribute joined washington's growing company of civil war generals. in life, no stranger to controversy, some thought him too political a general. the bronze roggen appears characteristically in the thick of battle. 12 feet in height, logan and his mount shared the memorial

pennsylvania, company c, the 50th of pennsylvania, they managed to fight in klein ya, virginia, vicksburg, knoxville, get back in time for the overland campaign in virginia in 1864. and a lot of it is rail movements. and the photographers which also enable early, preemptive and often false reporting by journalists. i say, one of the things with mead, one of the reasons mead isn't better remembered now is, um, he was a patrician, an upper crust philadelphian. he had no time for journalists. and in 1864 at coal harbor a journalist files a patently false report about the army of the potomac and mead and his leadership. and mead has this journalist ridden out of camp, backwards, facing backwards on a mule. and the soldiers all mocking him, laughing at him. well, journalists are herd animals, and they rally around their own. and the journalists make a compact they will not mention mead in any reports back to their newspapers unless it's an unfavorable case. and so he's written out. so he's the only native that journalists, the lost causers hate him for defeating robert e. lee in a fair fight,

vicksburg, mississippi, 88 was the high. and the record was 87.igh of 89. and in the south, denver, co, the high temperature is expected to be at 83 degrees and record is 78. guys, just extremely warm and hopefully this is not a sign of things to come this summer expecting more heat across parts of the southern half of the country like parts of texas and oklahoma. tomorrow we are talking about more extreme warmth in the same areas that saw the high temperatures reaching record levels today. kansas city could see a high of 88 tomorrow, and 83 in new orleans and 83 in dallas, and with a little bit of humidity it feels hotter. as we head westward, rapid city, you will be cooler, 57, 46 is the high in denver so seeing the cooler air from the rockies spreading east. as far as precipitation we have some concerns. across the ohio valley where we could see severe hail with isolated tornadoes possible. and across northeast we are not talking about severe weather but there are shower head our anyway and new york city will need umbrellas with low pressure th

you go to vicksburg which is the history of the civil war. i can't say enough about it. it's quite beautiful. people make -- all the people i talked to, i asked did they enjoy the trip. they said they're coming back. >> it is quite stunning. one of the nation's treasures, as you know, graceland, one of the most visited tourist destinations still in the world. what do you think, the fact of your husband's legacy, that it only continues to grow? >> it does continue to grow, and i think, you know, it's just that he gave us so much. he gave us so much that we, you know, from his music to his life to movies to his talent, that we're able to embellish and help that and with new generations. people who come here, we have, i believe, 10 million visitors that come here in memphis, and it's been -- that has been the place they want to go see first and foremost. there's so much about him that people are interested in. >> what do you think if your husband was alive today, what do you think he'd be listening to? >> what would he be listening to? >> yeah, what kind of music. what kind

and i had written about the battle of atlanta and the battle of nashville and then the battle of vicksburgd 1863. when i looked at shiloh again i began to make sense of it and the way to approach it. you had the men trying to kill each other in enclosed space of ground about 10 square miles for an entire day and a half and then it was over. i found, i think, enough personal accounts of people who were either there or that were involved in it in some way and let them tell the story from sort of beginning through end through their eyes and it sorted it out a little bit better. >> when i was growing up, my dad was a history teacher so i learned about shiloh through the james caan movie in the late '60s. now the word is synonymous with celebrity offspring or a film about it in the '90s. why do you think a battle this pivotal has been so forgotten and do you think it's too relevant to the issues that divide us today? >> we think we always know how to end something and it turns out war is hell and the assumptions people make about war aren't always that bright. >> they never are. you second-gues

vicksburg. okay. it's vicksburg.